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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
4-103-(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELATE REVIEW 
The Appellant (Loren Price Anderson) asserts the following issues on appeal: 
1. Father's Income. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to 
base the father's income on his pay stubs and tax returns? Did the trial court abuse its discretion 
when it imputed to the father a monthly gross income of $6,662.00, without adequate supporting 
evidence, nor qualified testimony as to the employment and earning potential of the father, 
without testimony regarding the father's probable earnings, as derived from the evidence 
submitted to the court regarding the father's historical income and work history, without 
adequate evidence regarding the father's occupational qualifications and without testimony 
regarding the prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgroW1d in the community and 
without information or evidence regarding the median earnings for persons in the same 
occupation as the father? Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to accept the father's 
evidence of his current income in the form of pay stubs and the most recently filed tax return? 
Even if the father should be imputed a monthly income of $6,662.00 per month did the court 
abuse its discretion when it did not accoW1t for the father's obligations to pay taxes on his gross 
income, and without an analysis for the necessary expenses required for self-employment 
expenses, or business operations from gross receipts? 
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The trial court's ruling regarding the issue of imputation of income for the father is reviewed to 
determine if the trial court misapplied the law in exercising it's discretion. See State v. Barrett, 
127 P 3d 682 (Ut. 2005) The court's interpretation of the statutory requirements are reviewed for 
correctness. See Lilly v. Lilley 250 P .3d 994 (Ut. App. 2011 ). 
2. Alimony. Did the Court err in concluding as a matter of law the father's 
Alimony obligation should be $1,900.00 per month, even if the father's income should be 
imputed at $6,662.00 gross per month, when the result the order of $1,900.00 per month to the 
mother, when combined with the award to the mother of child support, resulted in an award to 
the mother each month which was hundreds of dollars in excess each month of the mother's 
stated needs, as determined by the trial court? Did the Court err in finding that order of alimony 
must include expenses for the mother that she was not actually incurring and had never incurred? 
If the court's ruling regarding it imputation to the father of a monthly income of$6,662.00 was 
in error, was the resulting award of alimony to the mother an abuse of discretion? The trial 
court's ruling regarding its determination of alimony and child support is reviewed by the 
Appellate Court under the abuse of discretion standard of review. See Andrus v Andrus, 169 P.3d 
754, 757 (Utah App. 2007). 
3. Child Support. Did the Court err in setting the father's child support 
obligation in an amount based upon his imputed income of $6,662.00 per month? The trial 
court's ruling regarding its determination of alimony and child support is reviewed by the 
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Appellate Court under the abuse of discretion standard of review. See Andrus v Andrus, 169 P .3d 
" 754, 757 (Utah App. 2007). 
4. Did the trial court err in awarding the mother attorney's fees? The trial court's 
ruling regarding its determination of attorney's fees should be reviewed for correctness. See 
Connell v. Connell, 233 P.3d 836,842 (Utah App. 2010). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
i,,Jj U.C.A.§ 30-3-3 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) 
U.C.A§ 78A-4-103(2)(h) 
U.C.A. § 788-5-825 
Utah Code Ann.§ 788-12-201 
U.C.A. §788-12-203(7)(a)-(b)(renumbered 2008) 
Utah Code Ann.§ 788-12-210 
Utah Code Ann. §788-12-203(7)(b) & 5(b) 
·vi Utah Code Ann.§ 788-12-210(9)(a)(renumbered 2008) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Loren Anderson filed a Petition to Modify seeking a reduction or elimination 
of alimony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) and a reduction in child support 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-210, based upon a substantial change in circumstances, 
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regarding his income. After a bench trial on October 25, 2015, the trial court adjusted the father's 
child support and alimony obligations, as of the date of the decree of divorce, September 5, 2008. 
The Appellant/father (Loren Anderson) asserts that the court abused its discretion when it 
imputed the father's income in the amount of $6,662.00 gross income per month without 
following the required analysis as set forth in the Utah Code Ann., regarding imputation of 
income, and therefore, the resulting child support order and alimony order was in error. The 
father asserts that the trial court was required to base the father's child support and alimony 
income on his actual earnings, as evidenced by pay stubs and tax returns. 
Even if the Court's findings were correct as to the father's ability to earn $6,662.00 gross 
income per month, and even if the court was correct in finding that the mother's needs were 
$4,400.00 per month (R, paragraph 15) and the mother's income was $2,503.00 per month, the 
result would be that the shortfall for the Appellee/mother (Lynessa Anderson) each month of 
$1,897.00 and the father asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the father to 
pay the mother hundreds of dollars per month in excess of her needs. 
The trial court's findings that the mother's needs are $4,400 per month and that her 
income is $2,503, per month results in a monthly shortage for the mother of $1,897, before she 
receives child support or alimony. Therefore, the father asserts that it was an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to issue an order, wherein child support and alimony totaled $3,340.00 per 
month, (when there were four children) and that when the order for alimony and child support is 
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added to the mother's income of $2,503, the result is that the mother would have a total of 
$5,843 each month, which is $1,443.00 more than the mother's needs. 
The result of the Court's Order Modifying Decree of Divorce is that the amount of child 
support and alimony the trial court ordered the father to pay to the mother each month, results in 
an award in excess of the mother's needs when there were three minor children in the amount of 
$1,301.00 more than mother's needs as determined by the trial court. When there were two 
minor children the court's alimony and child support award results in an award in excess of the 
mother's needs in the amount of $1,143.00 per month. When there was only one minor child, the 
total of alimony and child support awarded to the mother was $2,615.00 which, when combined 
with the mother's income, resulted in an award to the mother of $718.00 more than the mother's 
needs, as determined by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellee/Petitioner (Lynessa Anderson) originally filed a complaint for divorce on 
February 13, 2008. 
The Complaint for Divorce alleged: the parties were married July 30, 1989 (R. 01) the 
parties had four minor children, (R.02), that the "mother is entitled to a reasonable sum per 
month as child support (R.02), that the mother should be awarded a "reasonable sum" for 
alimony (R. 03 ). 
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The Complaint for divorce did not set forth or allege either parties' income. (R. 0-05) 
Loren Anderson signed an Acceptance of Service which was filed with the court on February 29, 
2008. (R 12-13 ). 
The Decree of Divorce was issued on September 5, 2008. (R 53-60) The Decree of 
Divorce, at paragraph 6 set forth a child support obligation requiring Loren Anderson to pay 
$2,945.00 per month based upon a monthly income of $18,271.00 per month. (R. 54-55) 
The Decree of Divorce ordered Loren Anderson to pay alimony in the amount of 
$2,719.00 per month. (R. 55) Lynessa Anderson filed an Affidavit in Support of Default (R. 20-
27) but did not assert in the Affidavit her monthly needs or expenses and did not file a Financial 
Declaration nor proof of either parties' income. 
The court file does not contain any proof or verification of the father's income, for 
purposes of either child support or alimony prior to the time the father filed the Petition to 
Modify. Lynessa Anderson alleged in her Affidavit in Support of Default (R. 21) that Loren 
Anderson made $18,271.00 per month. However, no verification or evidence exists in the court 
file, in regard to either parties' income or needs, prior to the date when the Decree of Divorce 
was entered as required by U.C.A.§788-12-201(1) and 788-12-203(5), although the Affidavit 
asserted that the evidence was available to the mother. 
Prior to the entry of the decree of divorce, a Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of 
Records Deposition was filed by Lynessa Anderson on April 29, 2008 (R. 16-19) The Subpoena 
required the Rainbow Casino to produce the "W-2 for 2007" for Loren Anderson, as well as his 
6 
year to date income for 2008 and any retirement information available. (R. 16-17). However, 
there is no proof of service in the Court file to prove that the Subpoena was ever served and no 
W-2 was ever filed with the court prior to the entry of the decree of divorce, regarding the 
income of Loren Anderson for any year, and no income tax return was ever filed for Loren 
Anderson, prior to the Decree of Divorce being granted, even though Lynessa Anderson asserted 
that the information was available to her. 
An Affidavit of Income Verification was filed with the Court on July 29, 2008, (R. 33-
34) which was signed by Marilyn Moody Brown, attorney for Lynessa Anderson but it does not 
set forth the income of Loren Anderson, nor did Lynessa's attorney file the required 
verification/proof regarding the income of Loren Anderson, even though the document indicates 
it was available to both Lynessa Anderson and her counsel. On August 19, 2008, Lynessa filed 
an Affidavit of Petitioner's Income which asserted she had no income and was unemployed. (R. 
39-40). No tax returns were filed by either party prior to the date and time when the Decree of 
Divorce was entered. 
On August 19, 2008, Lynessa Anderson filed an Affidavit of Respondent's Income. 
However, no documentary evidence or proof of the income of Loren Anderson was attached. 
Loren Anderson's W-2 was not attached but there was an assertion that it was available to 
Lynessa. (R. 41-42) Lynessa Anderson asserted that Loren Anderson's "1099 for 2007 shows 
$219,246.00 per year or $18,271.00 per month in income" which affirms that even though 
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Lynessa Anderson claimed to have verification of the income of the father, that document was 
never filed with the court prior to the entry of the decree of divorce. (R. 16-17). 
When discussing the fact that no income verification existed for either party in the court 
file when the decree of divorce was entered, the trial court concluded, in the Order Modifying 
Decree, paragraph 20 that "father was most certainly not making over $200,000 per year at any 
time .... "(R. 830) After the trial held October 25, 2015, the trial court adjusted the father's child 
support and alimony obligations, based upon the court's imputation of income to the father and 
based upon the trial court's examination of the mother's needs and her income. 
Neither the father, the mother, nor any other witness or expert provided evidence or 
testimony to the trial court regarding the fathers' ability to earn. The father submitted tax returns 
and both the father and the mother relied upon the father's pays stubs as proof of the father's 
income. For example the mother submitted several exhibits to the court to prove the father's 
income, including Petitioner's exhibit 7, which was the parties' joint tax return for 2004, 
Petitioner's exhibit 8, which was the parties' joint tax return for 2005, Petitioner's exhibit 11, 
which is 13 of the fathers' pay stubs for his current employment. 
During the trial on the father's Petition to Modify, the issues of each parties' incomes was 
addressed, and the parties each submitted a Financial Declaration, each submitted tax returns and 
each submitted pay stubs. The Petition to Modify asserted that Loren Anderson had no income at 
all from February to May 2009. (R. 066) The Petition to Modify asserted that Loren Anderson 
had no ability to pay the court ordered alimony or child support as set forth in the Decree of 
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Divorce. (R. 066). During the trial on October 25, 2015, the witnesses which testified were: 
Jennifer Hutchings (current wife of Loren Anderson) (R. 846), Appellant Loren Anderson ( R. 
846), Steele Anderson ( adult child of the parties) (R. 846) Tyler Anderson ( adult child of the 
parties) (R. 846) Shane Withers (R.846) and Lynessa Anderson/Appellee (R. 846). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion by ordering the father to pay the mother a total for 
child support and alimony that is in excess of the mother's monthly needs, even if the court's 
findings as to the monthly needs of the mother were correct. The trial court abused its discretion 
by setting the mother's monthly needs in the amount of $4,400.00 per month because the amount 
of $4,400 per month, based upon expenses that the mother testified that he never had and did not 
have at the time of trial or prior to trial. The trial court abused its discretion by imputing the 
father's gross income at $6,662.00 per month without adequate evidentiary support and without 
following the Utah Code Ann. §78B- l 2-203(7)(b ), as to the required analysis and considerations 
for the imputation of income. The court abused its discretion by failing to accept the historical 
income of the father and by rejecting the father's proof of his current income. The result of the 
imputation of income to the father without following the statutory requirements was a child 
support and alimony obligation for the father that is not based upon the father's actual income. 
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Even if the father's income was correctly imputed at $6,662.00 per month, the court abused its 
discretion by failing to account for the father's tax obligations each month. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPUTING FATHER'S 
INCOME AT $6,662.00 PER 1\-iONTH 
Under Utah law, "[a] parent ... may at any time petition the court to adjust the 
amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances." Utah 
Code Ann.§ 78B-12-210(9)(a)(renumbered 2008) The trial court found that there has been a 
substantial change in circumstances "allowing the Court to modify the parties' Decree of 
Divorce ... " (R. 821, paragraph 3 of Order Modifying Decree of Divorce) There is no dispute that 
there was a substantial change in circumstances allowing the Court to adjust child support and 
alimony. (R. 821, paragraph 3) There is no dispute that the father never made $200,000 per year 
at any time (R. 830). There is no dispute that there is no evidence at all in the Court file prior to 
the father's filing the Petition to Modify that provided any evidence at all about the father's 
income excepting unsupported affidavits. The Order of Modification amends the father's child 
support and alimony, as of September 5, 2008, which is the date of the decree of divorce. (R. 
830). 
The issue before the court at trial is whether or not the court abused its 
discretion in imputing to the father a monthly income of $6,662.00 per month as income. The 
10 
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father, in this appeal must "marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that despite this evidence that the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against 
the clear weight of the evidence." See In re estate of Bartell, 776 P2. 885,886 (Utah 1989). 
The Order Modifying Decree of Divorce contains Findings of Fact, regarding 
the father's historical income, as follows: 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
"The father has not filed a tax return for 2014." (R. 822, paragraph 8) 
"The father filed a tax return for 2009 showing AGI of $6,278." (R. 822, paragraph 9) 
"He [father] filed a 2010 tax return showing AGI of $6,343.00." (R. 822, paragraph 9) 
"He [father] presented a 2011 return showing AGI of $8,887and a 2012 and 2013 return 
showing $15,835.00 and $22,645.00 respectively." (R. 822, paragraph 9) 
e. "These latter two returns are incomplete as the second pages of the forms 1040 are 
missing and there is no signature." (R. 822, paragraph 9) 
f. "Father's 2013 return contains a Schedule C listing $173,564.00 gross paid to him from 
g. 
h. 
Action Target and Valient Products but also about $162,000.00 in business expenses." 
(R. 822, paragraph 9) 
However, the father's 2013 tax return (admitted exhibit 2-B) sets forth a 1040 gross 
income for 2013 of$22,465. 
"A 2014 W-2 form from Steelcoat shows wages of $10,826.00 and a form 1099-misc. 
shows payment of $16,000.00 from Steelcoat to father. Father also produced paystubs for 
July 2014 through July 2015 from Steelcoat." (R. 822, paragraph 9) 
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1. Paragraph 16 of the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce sets forth the basis of the court's 
findings that the father should be imputed to have a monthly income of $6,662.00 per 
month. The basis for the imputation of $6,662.00 is that the father was capable of making 
$41,317 in W-2 income for 2004 (before he began abusing drugs) and the court then 
added an additional $20,000 to the father's stated income for 2004, because the court 
found that the father was carrying around large sums of cash. 
However, the court's findings ignore totally the mother's Exhibit 8 (admitted 
and unchallenged) which is a joint income tax return filed in 2005 by the parties, three 
years before the father began to "abuse drugs." The parties' joint tax return for 2005 
declared ajoint income of$16,917. The father's drug use began in 2008, which was the 
year the parties' decree of divorce was entered. (See mother's exhibit 12, criminal case 
history of father) The trial court disregarded the Petitioner's (mother's) exhibit 11 which 
is the father's pay stubs from his employment at Steelcoat. 
No evidence was submitted, nor testified to by either party, to support the 
court's finding that that the father carried around fifteen to twenty thousand yearly in 
undeclared "cash." (R 825) The evidence admitted to the court regarding the father's 
income prior to the divorce, is that that the father earned $41,000 in 2004 (mother's 
exhibit 7) and $16,917.00 in 2005 (mother's exhibit 8). The evidence admitted to the 
court, provided by the mother, regarding father's current income is Petitioner's exhibit 
11, which are 13 pay stubs from father's current employment. Even if the court is entitled 
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to randomly select one year's income, when determining the father's income, from the 
tax year 2004, which was in 11 years before the trial date, there is no basis to support the 
court's findings that the father also had an additional twenty thousand dollars in income 
in 2004 that needed to be added into the amount set forth on the parties' 2004 tax return. 
(R 827, paragraph 16 of the Order of Modification) There was no testimony, nor exhibits 
to support the trial court's findings that the father made twenty thousand more than 
$41,317.00 in 2004. It is undisputed and unrebutted that one year later, in 2005, the 
father's income was $16,917. (mother's exhibit 8) Even if the court was justified in 
assessing the father's ability to earn $41,317 per year, on the basis of the 2004 tax return, 
then at the most the father's imputed income would be $3,400.00 per month. It appears 
from the court's findings that the court was offended by the criminal history of the father 
to the point that the father's criminal record colored all of the court's findings of fact. 
In regard to the findings of the Court, in the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce 
(the "Order") the trial court found the father and his new wife to be incredible for a 
number of reasons as set forth below: 
"The new wife was unable to identify Steelcoat's tax year but father knew exactly 
what it was. She claimed to have talked to Action Target's installation director, but 
her later testified, denied talking to her and testified that he only dealt with father. 
The wife said she works three to four hours per day lining up jobs and making 
reservations for Steelcoat. She works with father to bid on projects and keeps books. 
Father works only at the company full time and his functions consist of running the 
company's projects. Wife states she pays father's child support out of a Steelcoat 
account. Father does not appear to pay tax on these funds. Father was much more 
familiar with Steelcoats operations and financial information than new wife was. He 
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helped her set up the company, which does the same thing he was doing before the 
company was set up. Father is not allowed to have a checking account due to his 
criminal convictions and he finances purchases on a credit card in mother's name. He 
also appears to use Steelcoat credit card which wife says she controls. Based on these 
factors the court finds Steelcoat is the marital property of his new wife but is 
controlled by him. The Court finds his and his wife's testimony on control of the 
company incredible." 
R 823, paragraph 10 of Order. 
The trial court also found, in the Order Modifying Decree of Divorce at paragraph 11, 
(R. 824) that the father was incredible as well and found as follows: 
"Father failed to provide complete tax records. His invoice swnmary from the company was 
incomplete and failed to include complete tax records, failed to provide his complete invoices 
or income records from his prior relationship with Action Target and failed to provide a 
compiete invoice summary relating to that relationship. He faiied to introduce a 20 i 4 return 
for Steelcoat even though the filing date is overdue and the finances are not complicated. 
Father represented in his financial declaration that his income is $2,000.00 per month. 
However, Steelcoat pays his child support of $600 so his income would be at least 10% 
higher than represented with these pre-tax dollars accounted for. It is unrebutted father told 
his son about one month before trial that if mother would stop pursuing him it would be 
easier and he would not have to hide things. By "hide" he [father] was referring to unreported 
income because the son was asking him for help with hockey dues. In fact, father has a long 
time practice of dealing in cash and not reporting the income or disclosing amount to mother. 
Father deals in frequently cash. He paid his son cash for a job and issues no tax forms. 
During his marriage to mother, he generally had large accounts of cash with him. After the 
divorce, on the less-than-frequent occasions when he paid mother money before Office of 
Recovery Services became involved, he paid in cash. His highest reported AGI while married 
to the mother was about $41,000.00. However, in that same year, besides always having 
large amounts of cash from his business, he was able to pay travel expenses and team fees for 
his son's hockey as well as for other's children. The sums amounted to well over $15,000.00 
per year - he was not only paying his but other children's expenses to ensure there was a 
team. He was able to afford an illegal drug habit and the court has never found a 
methamphetamine dealer takes anything but cash. He cannot have a checking account 
because of past forgery and thus deals in cashew he not using the mother's credit card. His 
crimes of moral turpitude impeach his testimony under Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Father's evasive demeanor on the stand regarding income and business did not 
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inspire confidence in his truthfulness." 
Marshaling: 
Two of the parties' sons testified at trial. The first was Steele Anderson. The 
second son to testify was Tyler Anderson. When Steele Anderson testified he did not provide 
address or age to the court. However, the age of both Steele and Tyler Anderson appear in 
the court record. The trial was held on October 23, 2015. According to the decree of divorce, 
Steele Anderson was born May 1, 1995. (R. 54) Therefore, at the time of trial Steel Anderson 
was 20 years old. Obviously, at the date and time of trial, Steele Anderson was not in high 
school, nor could he have been on a high school hockey team. Tyler Anderson was born 
August 3, 1992 (R. 54) and therefore on the date of trial, Tyler Anderson was 23 years of 
age. The parties were divorced September 5, 2008, when Tyler Anderson was 16 years of age 
and when Steele Anderson was 13 years of age. (R 53) 
Steele Anderson testified that the father made the comment "he made mention 
that if my mon would stop doing whatever he's doing it would be easier for him to not have 
to hide what he's doing." (R. 970, transcript of trial at page 126, lines 2-4) 
Steele Anderson was then asked: 
Q. "Did he [father] make that comment in relation to something personally you 
were asking for?" 
A. "Yes ma' am, it was for some hockey dues to help with my hockey season." 
The trial court's findings indicate that the trial court must have assumed that the 
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conversation had taken place as recently as the month prior to trial. Marshaling the support 
for such a finding, the record, at pages 969 and 970, (transcript of trial) sets forth the 
following question to Steele Anderson: 
Q. Has there ever been a time when you've had a conversation with your dad 
that has lead you to believe that he's hiding money?" 
A. "There were a couple of incidents. The most recent was September. I - he 
made mention that ifmy mom would stop doing whatever he's doing it would be easier for 
him to not have to hide what he's doing." (R. 969-970 transcript from trial pages 125, lines 
23-25, and page i26, Hnes 2-4) 
However, the court's findings that the conversation between the father and his 
son occurred one month before trial (or September 2015) is not supported by an examination 
of the entire transcript which contains the testimony of Steele Anderson and the mother, in 
regard to the issue of hockey costs. Steele Anderson stated that the "most recent was 
September" but Steele did not state a year. Also, Steele's brother Tyler Anderson testified 
that the events concerning the father's funding of hockey and hockey related costs occurred 
prior to the parties' divorce in 2008, and when Tyler Anderson testified he stated clearly that 
hockey was an activity that he participated in as a youth. 
Tyler Anderson who is 23 years of age testified as follows to the questions 
regarding hockey: 
Q. "Okay, can you tell the Court what kind of activities you would participate in 
as a youth?" 
A. "Hockey, for the most part, school, the normal things. 
Q. "With hockey, can you tell the court a little about how much that would 
cost?" 
A. "Well, I was young and I really don't know exactly. I think --- because for a 
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house league it was cheaper. That was the local stuff. Maybe 2,000 and then travel was 7 -
upwards of 7,000." 
Q. ;.'Were you responsible to pay for that as a youth or?" 
A. "· I was not." 
Q. "Did your parents pay for that?" 
A. "Yep." 
(R. 972, transcript from trial, page 128, lines 2-14) 
Even though the trial court's findings declare that the father spent between 
fifteen and twenty thousand in cash per year on hockey, that finding is not supported by the 
testimony of any of the witnesses regarding the issue of hockey costs; not the mother, not 
Tyler Anderson, not Steele Anderson, and not the father. This is a critical point because the 
court's imputation of income to the father was based on two figures combines: the father's 
2004 tax return and the trial court's finding that the father routinely had between fifteen and 
twenty thousand extra in cash which he failed to add into his income for tax purposes. Even 
if the father did have so much cash on hand, there was not one scintilla of evidence or 
testimony regarding the court's assumption that the father had cash in 2004 but did not report 
it on his income tax return. In fact, there is evidence available to rebut the finding and that is 
Petitioner's exhibit 8, at page 4 where the father declared that his gross receipts for 2004 was 
$343,614. It seems incredible for the court to find that the father would declare $343,614 in 
gross receipts, some of which must have been cash, and yet the father chose to squirrel 
twenty thousand in cash for himself in order to fund his children's hockey team. An 
examination of page four of Petitioner's exhibit 7 reveals that of the father's gross receipts of 
$343,614 that the father spent $269,614 on the costs of goods, leaving him only $74,346 in 
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gross income. The father's other business expenses that year totaled $29,888 of which 
$22,510 was commissions and fees. The trial court made no findings as to the actual content 
of the 2004 return and did not examine or discuss the return beyond it's reliance on line 36 
on page one wherein the adjusted gross income for the parties was set forth at $41,317. 
When the testimony of Tyler Anderson and Steele Anderson is examined, it is 
clear that Steele Anderson never testified as to any the exact year that his conversation 
occurred, but Tyler only stated the month and the topic, which was hockey. All of the 
testimony from Tyler Anderson, Steele Anderson, the mother and father all discuss the issue 
of hockey as occurring during the parties marriage. Tyler Anderson testified that the events 
concerning hockey occurred while he was in school and that hockey was a sport that 
occurred prior to the time when his parents divorced. The mother's testimony also confirms 
that the father's payment for hockey costs was prior to the divorce. 
The trial court found at paragraph 11 of the Order Modifying Decree that: 
" ..... , in that same year, besides always having large amounts of cash from his business, he 
was able to pay travel expenses and team fees for his son's hockey as well as for other's 
children. The sums amounted to well over $15,000.00 per year - he was not only paying his 
but other children's expenses to ensure there was a team." (R. 825) 
The mother did testify as to the payment of hockey fees, for other children but 
not Tyler or Steele Anderson. However, the mother never testified as to the amounts of cash. 
The mother stated the word "cash" in regard to the amount the father had on him. The mother 
testified "He always carried cash. He always had cash on hand, always) (R 996, transcript at 
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page 152, lines 18-19) Neither Tyler Anderson nor Steele Anderson testified to any figures in 
the fifteen to twenty thousand dollar range. Regarding the time when Tyler Anderson and 
Steel Anderson played hockey, the testimony of the mother confirms that the time when 
Tyler and Steele played hockey was prior to the decree of divorce being entered, not after. In 
responding to the questions asked to the mother by her counsel, Ms. Coil, the mother testified 
as follows: 
Q. "Okay, can you specifically talk about in 2006, right before you guys 
separated, your marital expenses at that time, you guys have a mortgage.?" 
A. "Un-huh, we had a mortgage. Our --- two of our boys played ice hockey. 
They both played on two travel teams. My older son swam a lot. I mean, he was always in 
training. He never competed because he couldn't-he's not competitive - but he - I mean, we 
spent a lot of time at the pool with him and we would go - when the boys were younger, 
generally they tried to keep the younger kids when they had travel weekends to tournaments 
together so they were in groups, but as they got a little bit older Tyler played in a different 
group and so Loren would take Tyler to tournaments and I would take Steele." 
Q. "all those expenses prior to 2006 were being paid for by Loren?" 
A. "Yes." 
R. 997-998, transcript from trial at pages 153, lines 21-25 and page 154, lines 1-14. 
The testimony of the mother, Lynessa Anderson is clear that the time frame 
when Loren Anderson paid for any costs associated with hockey was "prior to 2006." 
Additionally, the findings of the court that the sums for travel expenses 
amounted to "well over $15,000 per year" is not supported by the testimony of either son, nor 
the mother, nor the father. Tyler Anderson testified that he was young and "did not know 
exactly" what the costs of hockey were and he then guessed, when he was testifying, that 
the father spent maybe two thousand - or maybe seven thousand. Steele Anderson testified 
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that he asked his father for "some hockey dues" (transcript at page 126, lines 7-8) but Steele 
did not state what year that conversation occurred. The mother clarified that hockey occurred 
prior to 2006. Tyler Anderson testified that his father carried "a lot of cash" but did not ever 
state an amount. (R 974, transcript at page 130, lines 12-13) 
The Court's findings at paragraph 11 of the Order Modifying Decree find: 
"His highest year reported AGI while married to the mother was about $41,000. However, 
that same tax year, besides always having large amounts of cash from his business he was 
able to pay travel expenses and team fee for his sons' hockey, as well as other's children." 
The findings of the Court do not state what year the father earned "$41,000." 
However, ihat finding is supported by the mother~s exhibit number 7, which the court found 
credible. It is a joint tax return from 2004, which was not signed by either party. 
The father submitted tax returns for 2012 and 2013 which the court found to be 
incredible (paragraph 9 of the Order of Modification) because "there is no signature" on the 
father's tax returns. The trial court examined the faults in the father's exhibits and concluded 
that the lack of a signature in the tax return made the father incredible and the trial court 
examined the mother's tax return, which was only one page and contained no signature and 
found that return to be credible. The two findings cannot be reconciled. For example, the 
Order of Modification at paragraph 9 finds the father's evidence to be incredible because the 
tax returns for 2012 and 2013 "are incomplete as the second pages of the forms 1040 are 
missing and there is no signature." However, that finding is not accurate either, but is only 
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partially accurate. The exhibits admitted into evidence by the court do not support such a 
finding, as follows: 
Respondent's (fathers) exhibit 2 is a Financial Declaration dated and signed 
May 29, 2014 and exhibit 2 was received into evidence by the Court. Attachment C to the 
father's exhibit 2 is a tax return for 2013 in which pages 1 and 2 are both attached as well as 
Schedule C and a copy of the Utah State tax return for the father. It is true that the copy of 
the 2013 tax return was not signed by the father. However, the court found the mother's tax 
return to be credible and she submitted one tax return ( only one) for the tax year 2014 which 
is one page - does not have the second page - and is not signed by the mother. See 
Petitioner's (mother's) exhibit 4. 
It is true that the father's 2012 tax return attached to father's exhibit 2 had a 
page one for the tax return for 2012 but not a page 2. However, the act of not attaching a 
page 2 to the father's 2012 tax return resulted in a finding that the father was not "credible" 
by the Court. Yet, the mother's tax return, deemed to be "credible" by the trial court, was the 
mother's/Petitioner's exhibit 4, which was admitted by the court and it is the mother's tax 
return for 2014, which consisted of one page from the 1040A form, the tax return was 
unsigned and the other pages of the 1040A form were not attached. The father's 2013 tax 
return did have a page 2 and the court's findings is inconsistent with the evidence. 
The mother also submitted, exhibit 8, which was a joint tax return from 2005, 
indicating that the parties earned $16,917.00, and the return was not signed by either party. 
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Yet, the court did not find the mother incredible for submitting the return. The mother's 
exhibit 8 is only the first page of the joint tax return of the parties, it does not have a page 2 
and is not signed by either party. The Court based it's imputation of wages for the father on 
the mother's exhibit 7, which is a tax return from 2004 not signed by either party, yet relied 
upon by the court to impute income to the father. Yet, it is deemed credible by the court, 
when the same type of document submitted by the father was found by the court to be not 
credible. 
The Order of Modification also found at paragraph 11, that the "father's evasive 
demeanor on the stand regarding his income and the business did not inspire confidence in 
his truthfulness." (R 825) However, the trial court did not issue any findings beyond that 
statement that it disliked the father's evasive demeanor on the stand. In the Order of 
Modification, one sentence after trial court issued a finding that the father was incredible, 
the court, at paragraph 12 found the mother credible because "she supported her income 
testimony with pay stubs, a W-2 and a 2014 tax return. 
However, the father provided the trial court with a great deal of evidence 
beyond the mothers' submission of one tax return and her pay stubs. In support of the 
father's testimony regarding his income the father also produced the following evidentiary 
support: father's pay stubs (Petitioner's exhibit 11, father's attachment 1, to his exhibit 1) 
father's most recent tax returns (father's attachment 1 to father's exhibit 2 which was the 
father's 2011 tax return, the father's 2010 state tax return, the father's 2012 tax return, the 
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father's 2013 tax return which included pages one and two as well as the father's schedule C, 
the father's 2013 state tax return, and actual copies of the fathers pay checks, which were 
consistent with the father's pay stubs submitted to the court by both the father and the 
mother, father's exhibit 3 which was the father's tax return from 2009 with pages one and 
two attached, father's 20 IO tax return with pages one and two) 
The Order of Modification at paragraph 16 found that the father was voluntarily 
underemployed and capable of making $41,317, due to the 2004 tax return alone. The trial 
court then found that the father's 2004 income should be imputed as income to the father, 
ignoring or disregarding all other evidence produced by father and mother regarding the 
father's income, both current and historical. The trial court then added an additional $20,000, 
in income to the father's 2004 tax return, "'based on large hockey payments and his carrying 
large sums of cash from his contractor jobs" 11 years before date of trial regarding the 
father's income. 
Not one exhibit was submitted or accepted by the trial court to justify the 
finding of $20,000 additional yearly due to "unreported cash." There was no testimony 
regarding whether or not the father reported or did not report cash. The two minor children 
who testified never testified as to any specific amounts or sums that the father carried. Nor 
did the mother, or adult children, testify that they witnessed the father being paid in cash, nor 
did the court receive any evidence that the cash the father had was not reported in the father's 
tax returns. Tyler Anderson was the only witness who did state a figure when he testified that 
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he would guess that the amounts the father spent could be two thousand and could be seven 
thousand, because he really did not know. Obviously, Anderson did not know what the father 
spent in cash 11 years prior because he was only a child at the time. Tyler also testified that 
he really did not know when he testified "Well I was young and I really don't know 
exactly. I think-because for a house -house league it was cheaper. That was the local stuff. 
Maybe 2,000 and then travel was 7 - upwards 7,000." (transcript at page 128, lines 7-10) 
Tyler Anderson never testified as to the year that the payment was made for 
hockey costs and he also stated that both his parents paid for the costs. The mother never 
testified as to any specific amounts of cash that the father carried during the marriage. The 
mother's testimony was as follows: 
Q. Were there specific times that you saw- that you can tell the court where 
you saw money in your marriage, cash, this cash that in your marriage, cash, this cash that 
your' re talking about." 
A. "He always carried cash. He always had cash on hand, always." 
Q. "Was that the money over and above what he would give you every month to 
pay" 
A. "He kept a percentage to run his business." 
Neither the mother, nor either adult son, nor the father ever testified to an 
amount of cash, let alone sums as large as the court's findings that the father had between 
fifteen and twenty thousand dollars. Even if such an assumption were true, there was not one 
scintilla of evidence or testimony that such cash was received by the father every year. In fact 
the court's findings that the father was a criminal and incarcerated are mutually exclusive to 
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the notion that the father's regular income includes twenty thousand dollars in unreported 
cash. The trial court picked one tax return wherein the father earned $41,3 1 7 in 2004 - then 
ignored completely the fact that mother's exhibit number 8 indicated one year later the 
parties filed a tax return claiming $16,917 in total income (Petitioner's exhibit 8). The trial 
court then added twenty thousand dollars to the declared income of the parties' from 2004 
and imputed that income to the father, after finding that the father was voluntarily 
underemployed without any of the required analysis or evidence set forth in the Utah Code 
regarding proper process for a court to impute income to a party. 
The father's testimony on cross examination regarding the issue of his payments 
for hockey was as follows: 
Q. "Isn't it true that hockey's a pretty expensive sport? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Isn't it true that you were able to cover those costs of their hockey prior to 
2008? 
A. Um, yeah, with some help. 
Q. Isn't it true that you would sometimes pay for other kids' hockey fees 
because their families couldn't afford it themselves, correct? 
A. Yes there were times. 
R. 950~ transcript of trial at page 106, lines 22-25 and R. 951, transcript of trial at pages 107 
Instead of examining the statutory factors regarding a parties' ability to earn an 
income (when determining imputed income) the Order of Modification at paragraph 11 
instead examines the father's failures as a human being. The court's findings state that the 
father's "crimes of moral turpitude impeach his testimony under Rule 609 of the Utah Rules 
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of Evidence." Even assuming that the trial court is correct, and the father is morally bankrupt 
and is a horrible human being, that fact (even if true) does not justify the court's findings that 
the court should impute income to the father based upon an 11 year old tax return and adding 
to the tax return the sum of $20,000, in additional yearly income to the father, which the 
court added to $41,317 per year from the father's 2004 tax return. The trial court found at 
paragraph 16 of the Order of Modification that it was the: 
"Father's confessed hiding of income and Steelcoat's paying for at least some of expenses 
makes his now professed income of $2,000 unreliable. His failure to provide complete wage 
records and concealment causes the court to calculate a wage using reason and father's past 
practices.'' 
The trial court did not discuss the father's Exhibit 1, which coniaim:<l his pay 
stubs for 2014, nor the father's multiple tax returns as discussed herein. The father did supply 
wage records in the form of pay stubs and tax returns for multiple years, 2013, 2012 and 
2011. The mother supplied one tax return for 2014, which consisted of one unsigned page 
which did not even have a page 2, and some pay stubs. The same action by the father resulted 
in the complete dismissal by the trial court of all of the father's other evidence. 
Although the court was offended by the father's moral turpitude, the court failed 
to state how such horrific actions (by the father) and the father's past criminal records would 
or could increase the father's ability to earn an income, or effect the father's ability to earn. 
The findings of the court seem to imply that because the father is morally bankrupt that he 
can earn $6,662.00 per month. The opposite would appear to be the logical finding. The 
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result was an imputed income to the father of $6,662 per month. 
In order to prevent any injustices in such a case, the court was obligated to 
conduct an imputation analysis which involves determining whether or not the father was 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed and if so how much income should be imputed to 
the father. U.C.A. §78B-12-201(9)(a). accord U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(g). The Appellant/father 
agrees with the Court that there was a change in circumstances. The issue is how much 
income ought to be imputed as income to the father, and how is the income imputed to the 
father, if the court rejects the father's pay stubs and income tax returns because it finds the 
father to be lacking in credibility. 
See U.C.A. §78B-12-203(7)(a)-(b )(2008) 
In Busche v. Busche 272 P.3d 748,755 (Ut.App. 2012) the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that: 
Although there is no requirement that a parent intended to avoid [his or her] child support 
obligations by [his or her] actions, we do think that willful or voluntary unemployment or 
underemployment must result from an intent on the part of the parent to reduce or terminate 
his or her income" (citing to Adkins v. Adkins W.Va 602, 656 S.E. 2d47,53 (2007) 
In Busche the Utah Court of Appeals found at page 756: 
"In the end, based upon our interpretation of the imputation provision and our own relevant 
case law we agree with the conclusion of the Colorado Court of Appeals that "whether a 
person lost a job because of willful or knowing misconduct is not determinative of whether 
the person is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." 
Even if the trial court is correct and the father is voluntarily underemployed, 
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then the question becomes; did the trial court use the appropriate factors in determining what 
income to impute to the father without following the required steps to impute income? 
The trial court failed to follow the provisions set forth in U.C.A.§ 78B-12-
203(7)(b ), which requires that: 
"if income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and 
probably earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualification and prevailing 
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for 
persons in the same occupation in the same geographical areas as found in the statistics 
maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics." 
The Court's findings prove that the trial court did not follow the statutory 
guidelines for the imputation of income to the father. The Court's findings do not contain the 
required analysis as set forth above. 
In Busche v. Busche, 272 P.2d 748, 757 (Ut. App. 2012) the Utah Court of Appeals held: 
"Put differently, the court must determine whether there are jobs reasonably available to 
someone with the party's qualification and experience." 
Additionally, even if the court's findings as to the father's ability to earn $6,662.00 per 
month was correct, when the court considered the father's ability to pay alimony, it failed to set 
forth the father's net income after consideration of his tax obligations. Andrus v. Andrus 169 
P.3d 754,757 (Ut. App. 2007) 
II. 
EVEN IF THE COURT'S IMPUTATION OF INCOME TO THE FATHER IN THE 
AMOUNT OF $6,662.00 WAS CORRECT, THE ORDER OF ALIMONY TO THE 
MOTHER IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,900.00 RESULTED IN AN AW ARD TO THE 
MOTHER GREATHER THAN HER NEEDS 
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As to the issue of alimony, the Court found that the mother's reasonable monthly 
expenses to be $4,400.00 per month. (R 826, Order at paragraph 15). The mother submitted an 
Amended Financial Declaration (Petitioner/mother's Exhibit 2) wherein the mother claimed 
monthly expenses of $5,496.21. The Court removed the amount the mother claimed for money 
she spent on her adult children, school fees which can be waived and pet care. 
The mother's Amended Financial Declaration (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) also contained 
claims for expenses for which she testified that were not actual expense and which were not 
supported by any evidence and which did not exist, but were still allowed as expenses by the trial 
court. On cross examination the mother was asked the following: 
Q. "Okay on the next page you've testified - now we're at page 7 on Exhibit number 2 -
you've testified that you never have been able to contribute to retirement, and it says 200 a 
month you contribute to your 401-K. Do you contribute to retirement or have you still not been 
able to do that? 
A. I've never contributed to retirement. 
Q. So that ---
A. That was anticipated. 
Q. So some of-many of these [expenses] on here aren't actual expenses. They're what 
you hope to have? 
A. Not many of them. Two of them are; my car payment and retirement. 
Q. So the retirement and health insurance, because you-
A. And health insurance. 
Q. So that isn't an actual payment. The medical insurance deductible payment, that isn't 
-that also isn't an actual payment because you don't have any medical insurance. You can't 
deduct if you don't have insurance, correct? 
A. Correct. 
(R 1025, transcript of trial at page 1025, lines 7-25) 
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The costs set forth in the mother's Amended Financial Declaration for costs she admitted 
do not exist are as follows: 
$200.00 per month retirement contribution (Petitioner's exhibit 2, page 7) 
$350.00 automobile loan (Petitioner's exhibit 2, page 6) 
$360.00 health insurance premiums (Petitioner's exhibit 2, page 6) 
$300.00 medical insurance deductible payment (Petitioner's exhibit 2, page 7) 
Toial of expenses that were not actuaiiy incurred: $i,2i0.00. 
Therefore, if the monthiy need for the mother, which was estabiished by the triai court, 
were reduced by the expenses allowed by the court that were not incurred by the mother at all, 
then the mother's established needs (not challenging any of the receipts or documentation 
provided by the mother) would be $4,400.00 minus the claimed expenses which do not exist uf 
$1,210.00 which would leave the mother with a monthly need to pay her expenses which she 
testified to of $3,190.00. 
The court found that the mother had included expenses that she does not have as follows, 
at paragraph 15 of the Order: "She included expenses that were reasonable, such as a car, 
insurance and health insurance, even though she does not presently have them but would have 
them if father paid support." However, even if that is true, there absolutely no evidence or 
testimony before the court that such additions were expenses during the parties' marriage. 
The mother never testified the reason for her claimed expense of retirement was 
something that she had been afforded during the parties' marriage. The mother testified that she 
never had any contributions to retirement. The trial court's findings that the expenses stated by 
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the mother, which she presently did not actually incur should be imputed in her monthly needs 
was not supported by her testimony of expenses incurred during her marriage. For example, the 
mother's Amended Financial Declaration states that she contributed $200.00 per month to her 
retirement. It does not indicate that the claim was made because she hoped to someday contribute 
to a retirement account, nor did she testify she had done it during marriage and should be able to 
resume the practice, but admitted that she never had spent funds on the expense retirement. 
In the case of Woolums v. Woolums, 312 P 3d. 939 (Ut. App. 2013) the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that when the court examines the issue of both existing expenses and future 
expenses, that are necessary to maintain an appropriate standard of living, that a party could 
testify regarding future expenses which were not actually being incurred. 
However, the Woolums case can be easily distinguished from this case because the 
mother never testified at all regarding the amounts she spent during her marriage. She did not 
even state the mortgage payment amount that she incurred during her marriage, but only that she 
paid a mortgage payment. The purpose of alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain 
as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse 
from becoming a public charge. See Dahl v. Dahl 345 P.3d 566 (2015) 
When testifying about her needs to the trial court the mother testified as follows: 
Transcript at page 144, lines 11-12, the mother's attorney states to the mother that she 
intends to ask her questions about "your income." (R 988) 
Transcript at page 150, lines 4-5, the mother's attorney states the following to the mother: 
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Q. "Can you tell me a little bit about the money-how you guys' finances were during 
the marriage?" (R 994) 
A. "During the marriage we had separate accounts so he would give me lump sums to 
pay the expenses." (R 994) 
The only testimony that the mother gave regarding her standard of living dwing the 
parties' marriage is found in the transcript at page 153, lines 21-23 when the mother's attorney 
ask the mother the following question: 
Q. ''Okay, can you specifically talk about in 2006, right before you separated, your 
marital expenses at that time? Did you guys have a mortgage?" 
A. "Un-huh, we had a mortgage. Our - two of our boys played ice hockey. They both 
played on two travd teams. iviy oider son swam a iot. i mean, he was aiways in training. He 
never competed because he couldn't-he's not competitive - but he - I mean, we spent a lot of 
time at the pool with him and we would go - when the boys were younger, generally they tried to 
keep the younger kids when they had travel weekends to tournaments together so they were in 
groups, but as they got a little bit older Tyler played in a different group and so Loren would take 
Tyler to tournaments and I would take Steele." 
(R 997) 
Q. "All those expenses prior to 2006 were being paid for by Loren?" 
A. "Yes." 
The mother never testified what the expenses were for her during her marriage, 
nor what they were for, except she stated that she had a "mortgage" during the parties' 
marriage. On cross examination the mother was asked about her contributions to a retirement 
account and she answered at page 181 of the transcript, line 12: 
"I've never contributed to retirement." 
(R 1025) 
32 
~I 
It is also important to note that when being examined by her attorney the mother 
asserted that she had a car payment and then on cross examination the mother admitted that 
she did not actually have a car payment. (See transcript at page 181, lines 17-18. (R 1025) 
The mother also testified about her current expenses and the contents of her 
financial declaration, when the mother's counsel states to her at page 161 of the transcript, 
lines 5-6 the following: 
Ms. Coil (atty.) "Let's go down your expenses real fast." 
Ms. Coil then proceeded to go through the mother's stated expenses "real fast" and never 
once ask the mother if the expenses claimed were the same as those the mother had when she 
was married. The mother was never asked if the expenses were new, nor was the mother asked if 
she set forth in her monthly expenses any expenses that she had during her marriage, that she 
was not unable to afford. For example, at page 165 of the transcript, lines 10-11, Ms. Coil asks 
the mother: 
Q. "Have you been able to contribute to or plan for retirement? 
A. "No." 
(R 1009) 
Even if the mother had contributed to retirement during her marriage, and even if she so 
testified, the trial court should not have included the $200 per month asserted by the mother as 
expenses for retirement because the Utah Courts have held that it is not one of the function of 
alimony to provide for retirement. See: Dehm v. Dehm 545 P.2d 525 (Ut. 1976) 
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The court's Order at paragraph 13 found that the mother's monthly income is $2,503. If 
the mother's expenses were reduced by the amount she overstated her expenses for expenses that 
do not exist ($1,210.00) and that were not established at trial as part of her expenses during 
marriage, then the mother would have a shortage each month of $3,190 (mother's expenses) 
minus her income of$2,503 for a shortage each month for the mother of $687.00. 
No matter what the father earns and assuming that the father could afford to pay alimony 
in any amount, the court would first have factor in the father's child support obligation before 
awarding the mother alimony. Certainly, there is no evidence to support an award of alimony to 
the mother of $1,900.00 per month even if the father did have the ability to earn $6,662.00 per 
month. 
When the court awarded alimony to the mother of $1,900 per month the court failed to 
take into account the court's award to the mother of child support. The result that even if the 
mother needed $4,400.00 per month and even if the court is permitted to order the father to pay 
for expense the mother does not and has never had, the fact remains that the court's award to the 
mother of $1,900.00 per month plus child support results in the mother's having received 
hundreds of dollars per month more than her stated need for years and years. 
Paragraph 28 of the trial court's Order sets child support for four children at $1,446.73, 
and for three children at $1,297.70, for two children at $1,139.94 and for one child at $714.64. 
Therefore, the Respondent's alimony ($1,900 per month) and child support, when 
combined is as follows; 
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4 children: $3,346.73 per month 
3 children: $3,197.70 per month 
2 children: $3,039.94 per month 
1 child: $2,614.64 per month 
Even if the trial court were allowed to force the father to pay over one thousand per 
month for expenses that were not expenses during the parties' marriage, and even if the court 
were allowed to impute the father's income at $6,662.00 per month without following the Utah 
Code for factors used for imputing the income for the father, and even if the court is permitted to 
ignore the father's income and proof of income and ignore the father's pay stubs, and even if the 
court was not obligated to factor in the father's tax obligations for an income of $6,662.00 per 
month, the orders of the court as set forth above would result in the mother having a net benefit 
each month as follows: 
Mother's needs as established by the court= $4,400.00 per month. 
4 children- $2,503 (income) and $3,346.73 (child support and alimony)= $5,849.73 or 
$1,449. 73 excess 
3 children - $2,503 (income) and $3,197.70 =$5,707.7 or $1,307.7 excess. 
However, if the trial court is not allowed to order the father to pay alimony for expenses 
that do not even exist, then the excess to the mother for the time period when she had four 
children would have been over $2,600 per month. 
Even if the father cannot challenge the imputation of a monthly income to him that he 
never made and does not make, the damage to the father by the Order of Modification is 
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impossible to imagine, until one examines the judgments set forth against the father in the Order 
at paragraph 30, for $152,689.90 for past due alimony and $55,901,09 set forth in paragraph 28 
of the Order for past due child support. 
As to alimony, the trial court should consider the mother's actual needs, her short fall and 
the amount of child support being ordered. 
In Roberts v. Roberts, 335 P3d 378, 384 (Ut. App. 2014) the Utah Court of Appeals 
discussed that the trial court had awarded the wife a: 
"total of $1,662 in monthly support payments ($1,281 in alimony plus $381 in child support) 
even though it's findings demonstrated that Wife's monthly need-which might include some 
significant part of her children's expenses - was just $1,000.00" 
The court in Roberts found that a total award, that is both alimony and child support 
combined should be consistent with the demonstrated monthly need unless the court explains 
why it issued an award in excess of the wife's needs. In this case, the trial court ignored the 
award of child support and instead issued the award of alimony without regard to factoring in the 
award to the wife of child support. 
III. 
THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING CHILD SUPPORT WAS NOT BASED UPON 
THE ACTUAL INCOME OF THE FATHER AND THE COURT FAILED TO IMPUTE 
INCOME PURSUANT TO THE PROVISINS OF THE UTAH CODE 
U.C.A.§78B-12-203(7)(b) states the following regarding imputed income: 
"if income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and 
probably earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualification and prevailing earnings 
36 
for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the 
same occupation in the same geographical areas as found in the statistics maintained by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
None of the findings of the court regarding the father's income considered the factors as 
required. U.C.A.§ 78B-12-203c also requires that ·'"Historical and current earnings shall be used 
to determine whether an underemployment or overemployment situation exists." 
Except for the year 2004, the historical and employment earnings of the father were 
disregarded in determining the father's income. 
IV 
THE COURT'S AW ARD OF ATTONREY'S FEES WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
In this matter, the Court awarded the fees to the mother based upon the findings set forth 
in paragraph 23 of the Order. The court issued the following: 
"In this case, the court Concludes although father has been able to get support and income 
modified from the decree, his hiding of income and failure to be forthcoming with complete 
records make it inequitable to award him fees. Further he did not obtain nearly the results he 
desired - basically validation of his claim that he only makes about $11 per hour. Those same 
factors would allow an award to mother under the bad faith provision in title 78 of the Utah Code 
annotated. U.C.A. 78B-5-825. Further, since father has not been paying adequate alimony or 
child support mother cannot afford attorney's fees but father has the ability to pay them and thus 
mother is awarded fees under U.C.A. section 30-3-3." 
The court found that the mother was entitled to an award under 78B-5-825 which states: 
"(l) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the 
court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith, except under subsection 2." 
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Even if the court's opinion of the father was extremely negative, the findings should still 
have been fair and based on evidence and should have been consistent with the requirements of 
the Utah Code as to imputation of income. The court granted the father's petition to lower his 
child support and alimony but did not agree with the father that his current income is $2,000.00 
per month and instead imputed income to the father but failed to follow the statutory provisions 
for imputing income. Such an action does not mean that the father litigated in bad faith. In fact, 
many of the findings of the court, in regard to the father, were not supported by the evidence. 
One such example is that the court found at paragraph 10 of the Order ( regarding the 
father's income) "wife stated [meaning the current wife of Loren Anderson] she pays father's 
child support out of a Steelcoat account. Father does not appear to pay tax on these funds." 
That finding of the court is not what the wife of Loren Anderson testified to the court. 
The wife testified that Loren Anderson does not have a checking account due to his 
criminal record. The wife testified that she writes Loren Anderson a check and then cashes his 
check for him. Then the question was asked as follows: 
"Q. Okay, so you cash it and then turn around and pocket the cash for yourself? 
A. No. 
Q. So you pay your bills; how does he contribute to your bills. Usually you can't pay bills 
in cash. So what I'm asking is if you cash his check, how are you - how is he 
contributing to the bills? 
A. I take out whatever he is contributing then he has the rest. Mainly his bill I guess 
would be his child support." 
(R. 985, transcript at page 51, lines 1-9) 
Also submitted to the Court was the pay stubs of Loren Anderson. 
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See Petitioner's Exhibit 11. 
An examination of Petitioner's exhibit 11 indicates that Loren Anderson does pay federal 
taxes. Therefore, when the court found that the "father does not appear to pay taxes" and that the 
wife of Loren Anderson pays his child support for him, the actual transcript does not support 
such a finding. 
The Court's Order of Modification also results in an award of child support and alimony 
to the mother in excess of her needs each month, because the court failed to factor in its award of 
child support when considering the alimony award. 
When awarding attorney's fees, the trial court should have considered (1) the wife's 
financial need, (2) the ability of the father to pay and (3) the reasonableness of the fees. 
See Oliekan v. Oliekan 147 P.3d 464 (Ut. App. 2006) and Connell v. Connell 233 P.3d 836, 843 
(Ut. .. App. 2010) 
The award of attorney's fees cannot survive appellate review because it results in a 
manifest injustice to Loren. Without an appropriate consideration of the relevant attorney fees 
factors, the trial court's award of attorney's fees appears to be punitive in nature, rather than 
restorative as case law requires. The award of fees appears to be consistent with the trial court's 
view Loren Anderson, as a bad man not deserving of the benefits of the Utah Code provisions. 
As the court states in paragraph 11 of its Order of Modification, it believes that Loren Anderson 
is a person who has "crimes of moral turpitude" and an "evasive demeanor." 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion by imputing the monthly income of $6.662.00 to the 
father without conducting the required analysis as set forth above. It is uncontested that Loren 
Anderson established a change of circumstances and was entitled to a reduction of alimony and 
child support. It is uncontested that Loren Anderson's income was not ever substantiated prior to 
the trial on October 25, 2015. Further principles oflaw equity, and fundamental fairness prohibit 
the result that the trial court reached in this case, because the result unconscionably impoverishes 
Loren Anderson, and benefits the mother, even if Loren Anderson did earn $6,662 per month as 
monthly income. Because the trial court refused to accept the evidence presented to the court by 
Loren Anderson and instead chose to demean him, the negative result was even more profound. 
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to the mother. 
Accordingly, the Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
decision to impute income to Loren without benefit of proper analysis as required and ordered to 
base his income on his pay stubs and tax return provided to the court as exhibits. It is evident that 
the court imputed Loren's income so that it could justify the award of alimony. The alimony 
should be eliminated. The award of attorney's fees should be eliminated. The fact that even if 
Loren Anderson did earn $6,662 per month as income results in the mother's having hundreds of 
dollars more each month than she needs is indicative of the level of the abuse of discretion in this 
matter. 
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Respectfully Submitted this 10th day of November 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ On this 10th day of November 2016 two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
brief were mailed, postage prepaid to the following: 
Jill L. Coil 
Luke A. Shaw 
Coil Law 
10815 South 700 East 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Chris Walker 
Attorney General, 0 RS 
150 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84604 
STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE 
The foregoing Appellants Brief contains 11,594 words and therefore in in compliance 
with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as to the length of the Brief because the Appellant's 
Brief is less than 14,000 words, excluding the cover sheet, and excluding the table of contents. 
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APPENDIX A 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
&f I s/og l@1: Deputy 
Marilyn Moody Brown, No. 4803 
MOODY BROWN & BROWN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
2525 N. Canyon Rd. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 356-8300 
Fax: (801) 356-8400 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, UT 84601 
L YNESSA MICHELLE ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
LOREN PRICE ANDERSON, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. Oe,£..l,L/,-00.3f.J?1 
Judge fr--ect. 17 t-ton:~ . ....-d 
Division No. '7 
Commissioner Thomas Patton 
This matter comes before the court for a final entry of the Decree of Divorce. Default 
was entered against the Respondent for his failure to respond to the Complaint for Divorce. The 
Court having reviewed the Petitioner's Affidavit in Support of Default and the pleadings in this 
matter and having previously entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The bonds of matrimony and the marriage contract heretofore existing by and 
between the Petitioner and Respondent be, and the same are hereby dissolved, and the Petitioner 
is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from Respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable 
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differences, said Decree to become absolute and final upon entry by the Court in the Register of 
Actions. 
2. Residency. Petitioner is a bona fide resident of Utah County, State of Utah, 
and has been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
3. Marriage Statistics. Petitioner and Respondent were married on July 30, 
1989, in South Lake Tahoe, Nevada, and are presently married. 
4. Children. There have been four children born as issue of this marriage: 
Name Date of Birth 
Kyle D. Anderson July 13, 1990 
Tvler A. Anderson Amrust 3, 1992 
Steele N. Anderson May 1, 1995 
Tori S. E. Anderson Julv 21, 2003 
5. CustodyNisitation. The Mother is awarded the permanent care, custody and 
control of the minor children of the parties, subject to the Father's right to visit with the children 
at reasonable times and places. There shall be no use of illegal drugs while the Respondent is 
exercising parent time with his children. 
6. Child Support. The Respondent's income is in dispute. The Respondent has 
not filed taxes for 2006 or 2007. His 1099 for 2007 shows $219,246 per year or $18,271 per 
month in income. The Petitioner is not employed, but should have income imputed to her of 
$1,014 per month. The Father's child support obligation is $2,945 per month. The child 
support obligation of Father shall be effective February 1, 2008, and continue until a child 
becomes 18 years of age, or until a child's normal and expected date of graduation from high 
2 
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school, whichever occurs later. The child support is payable one-half on the 5th day of each and 
every month, and one-half on the 20th day of each month. 
7. Utah is the home state of the minor children, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
45c-20 l (1 )(a)( l 953 ), as amended. 
8. Other Proceedings. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-205 and Rule 4-
901 (b) CJA, there are no proceedings for custody of the above-named minor child filed or 
pending in the Juvenile Court, and that the Petitioner has not been a party or participated in any 
other capacity or any other litigation concerning the custody of this child in the state or any other 
state. 
9. Child Care Expenses. In accordance with U.C.A. §78-45-7.16, each parent 
shall equally share the reasonable work-related and/or education-related child care expenses for 
the minor children. 
10. Alimony. The Petitioner is awarded the sum of $2,719 per month as alimony 
from the Respondent, commencing February 1, 2008, and continuing for a period equal to the 
length of the marriage, or until the death of either party, the Petitioner's remarriage, or 
cohabitation with another person, whichever occurs first. Said support is payable one-half on the 
5th and one-half on the 20th day of each month. Alimony is tax deductible to the payor and 
taxable to the payee. 
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11. Personal Property. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties 
acquired certain items of personal property. Said personal property is awarded to each of the parties 
as they have heretofore divided it 
12. Vehicle. The Respondent shall buy for the Petitioner a new vehicle, inasmuch as 
her Yukon was totaled when he was driving it and it was hit by another car. The Respondent shall 
buy a car of Petitioner's choice and the Petitioner shall pay the payments each month on the car. 
13. Real Property. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired real 
property located at 871 W. 1600 N., Orem, Utah. The Wife is awarded all right, title, and 
interest in and to said real property. The Husband hereby waives any right, title, or interest he 
may have in said real property. The Wife shall accept and assume exclusive responsibility for 
any and all debt or obligation arising out of the purchase or ownership of said real property. The 
Husband shall execute a Quit Claim Deed to transfer all his right, title, and interest in and to said 
real property to Wife. 
14. Debts. The parties acquired debts during the marriage. Each party will 
assume, and hold the other harmless from liability on, the following debts: 
Oblie:ation Amount Oblie:or 
Home mort2a2e Balance Petitioner 
Familv First (Respondent's truck) $9,000 Respondent 
Respondent's student loans Balance Resoondent 
Petitioner's credit cards Balance Petitioner 
Respondent's credit cards Balance Respondent 
a. Other Debts. Each party will be responsible to pay any other debt he 
or she individually incurred. 
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b. Creditors. The parties understand that for joint debts upon the entering 
of the Decree of Divorce of joint debtors, the claim of a creditor remains unchanged unless 
otherwise provided by the contract, or until a new contract is entered into between the creditors 
and the debtors individually. 
c. Notification to Creditors. The parties are ordered to notify their 
respective creditors for joint debts regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities, and regarding the parties' separate current addresses. 
d. Delinquency in Payments. If either party is obligated on a joint-
secured debt, the payment of that debt must remain current. In the event that a payment is not 
paid in a timely manner, the secured asset must be placed immediately on the market for sale in 
order to protect the joint debtors. A party who makes payment on a delinquent debt in order to 
protect his or her credit rating, may seek reimbursement of the payment of that debt in addition 
to interest and attorney's fees from the other party. 
15. Life Insurance. The Respondent is ordered to maintain in full force and effect 
a life insurance policy on his life in the face amount of $350,000, until such time as the last of 
the parties' minor children reaches the age of eighteen ( 18). During such period the Respondent 
is ordered to designate the Petitioner and children as sole and equal beneficiaries on said life 
insurance policy. The Respondent shall submit once a year to the Petitioner proof that the policy 
is in full force and effect. 
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16. Medical/Dental Expenses. In accordance with U.C.A. §78B-12-212, 
insurance for the medical and dental expenses of the minor children shall be provided by the 
party who can obtain the best coverage, if it is available at a reasonable cost. The Husband is 
currently providing said insurance. 
a. Each parent shall share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium 
actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. The children's portion of the 
premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid. The premium expenses for the 
children shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered 
under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case. 
b. Each parent shall share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured 
medical, dental, orthodontia, eye care, counseling, prescriptions, deductibles, and copayments, 
incurred for the dependent children and actually paid by the parents. 
c. The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on 
or before January 2, of each calendar year, if there is a change in the previous coverage or 
provider. The parent shall notify the other parent of any change of insurance carrier, premium, 
or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he or she first knew or should have known of the 
change. 
d. The parent who incurs medical and dental expenses shall provide 
written verification of the cost and payment of medical and dental expenses to the other parent 
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within 30 days of payment. The other parent will remit payment within 30 days of receipt of the 
verification. If neither party is able to secure said insurance at a reasonable cost, each party 
should be responsible for the payment of one-half of all reasonable and necessary medical and 
dental expenses for the minor children as indicated. 
17. Retirement and Savings. Neither party has a pension nor a profit sharing plan 
through his or her place of employment or otherwise. 
18. Dependency Exemptions. The Wife is awarded the dependency exemptions 
for the parties' minor children. 
19. Attorney's Fees and Costs. It has been necessary for the Petitioner to secure 
the services of an attorney to represent her in this action and the Respondent shall pay the 
Petitioner's attorney's fees. 
DATED this __ day of July, 2008. 
RECOMMENDED BY: 
COMMISSIONER 
~-------------------
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DATED this£_ day 0~2008. 
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NOTICE TO RESPONDENT 
TO: LOREN ANDERSON 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, attorney for Petitioner, will 
submit the above and foregoing Decree of Divorce to the Fourth District Court for signature, 
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, 
unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.7(f)(2). 
Dated this JI day of July, 2008. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFI:AM MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 3} day of July, 2008, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Loren Price Anderson 
c/o LA Interiors 
871 W 1600N 
Orem UT 84057 
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Rosemond Blakelock #6183 
Attorney for Respondent 
1832 North 1120 West 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 356-1720 
.·,:. ·;·:~.:•:... URT 
,~r1'DivliM,l l.O , 
. S iATE 0~ UTAH 
UTA!-! c:t::-nY 
ZOii FEB 28 P ll: Sb 
IN '1'HE FOURTH DISTRICT COtJRT OF UTAH CO'ON'l'Y 
STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 west, Provo, Utah 84601 
LYNESSA MICHELLE ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, PETITION FOR MODIFICATION: 
v. 
LOREN PRICE ANDERSON 
Respondent. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
Case No. C ~ 00 "3(o 7 
The Respondent states as follows: 
1. The parties were divorced on September 5, 2008. 
2. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce the parties the 
Respondent was earning $18,271.00 per month and the father's 
child support was set in the amount of $2,945.00 per month. 
3. Since the Decree of Divorce was entered the Respondent's 
income has drastically decreased and he is now not capable of 
earning as much as he did at the time the marriage. 
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4. At this time the parties have two minor children. 
5. The Respondent does not even have enough income at this 
time to pay the child support as ordered because the ordered 
child support is in excess of the income of the Respondent. 
6.From February 2009 until May 2009 the Respondent had no 
income at all due to incarceration. 
7. The Respondent has no ability to pay the Court ordered 
child support nor any alimony. 
8. The child support should be adjusted and set in an amount 
pursuant to the guidelines. 
9. The foregoing constitutes a substantial change of 
circumstances such that the Decree of Divorce should be modified 
as follows; 
i. The Respondent's child support should be modified and set 
in an amount pursuant to the guidelines. 
ii. The Decree of Divorce should be modified pursuant to the 
change in circumstances set forth above, 
iii. For any other modifications that the Court determines 
to the be necessary and just, and consistent with the terms set 
forth above, 
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VElUFJ:CATJ:ON 
The foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge. 
Dated and signed this ltth day of :J"O..Y\\JO..f\./ 2oll. 
~· > 
. ~ 
. ~ 
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D# 859332 BLAKELOCK 
CONSTABLE'S 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
ZOU ~1/\R -1 P l+= 53 
PLAINT:tFF: ANDERSON, LYNESSA M:tCHELLE 
vs. 
DE~: ANDERSON, LOBEN PlUCE 
PROCBSS: smet)NS & PET:tT:tON 
CASE: 084400367 
Court Date: 
1) I served the attached procaas in the manner indicated !:)el.ow, 
2) I was at the time 01! Ws service a duly qualifiacl and acting peace officer or a person o,rar the age of 18 years. 
'-' 3) I am not a party to this aation. 
I served: ANDERSON, LYNESSA M:tCHELLE 
3 ~ 2. \ ·. '2..0 Date Served: ____ ._J _______ , 2011 _____ _ 
Address of Service: ✓ 871 W1600N Orem 
I 
c'1) I delivered a copy of this process to Anderson, LyneBBa Michelle personally. 
I left a copy of this p:coceBB at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of 
.lnda:cson, Lynessa Michelle 
with ____________________ , a person of suitable age and discntion there residing. 
Pursuant to 78B-5-705: 
Service$ 
Mi.1eage $ 
Other$ 
TOTAL$ '1fi/ 
ru CIIIIRmll na oo. 17-ua-•-2 
IU 110! 81101a1 'lO Blr SIRVD 
I certify under orimina1 pena1ty of the State of Utah that 
the foregou,g is true and ~~ 
Date Executed: 3 · 1 :z..o \ \ 
Anthony R. Fern1und 
P.O. BOX 963 
Provo. tr.r 84603 
Constab1e or Server 
:r asked and veri.fi.ed the party bei.ng served i.s i.s not~ 
in the aoti.ve mi.1i.tary 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNES SA MICHELLE ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
LOREN PRICE ANDERSON, Civil No. 084400367 
Judge SAMUEL D. MCVEY 
Respondent. 
The Court heard this case at a bench trial on October 23, 2015 on respondent's petition to 
modify a decree of divorce. Jill L. Coil, Esq. presented petitioner's case and Rosemond V. 
Blakelock, Esq. presented respondent's case. For clarity the Court will refer to petitioner as 
''mother'' and to respondent as "father." The issues presented to the Court were whether father's 
child support and alimony obligations should be reduced based on the allegation he makes much 
less income than identified in the decree. Having heard the evidence and arguments of counsel, 
the Court now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I . A September 5, 2008 Decree of Divorce in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
dissolved the parties' 19 year marriage. The parties had four minor children at the time. Father 
was in and out of jail for illegal drug abuse, fraud, theft and forgery around this time, was served 
with the summons petition for divorce, accepted service and did not answer the summons. 
Mother's counsel obtained a certificate of default and subsequently a default judgment. 
2. Father did not file tax returns for tax years 2006-2008. Mother subpoenaed pay 
records from the casino where father worked as a contractor and obtained and a 2007 IRS form 
1099 showing father received an average of$18,271 per month. Her attorney verified the form 
1099 information by affidavit. The decree listed father's income in that amount. It imputed 
$1014 per month to mother in that she was a stay at home parent during the marriage. 
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3. Based on this income father was assessed child support of $2945 per month and 
alimony of $2719 per month for 19 years. There is now only one minor child so the child 
support is now less W1der the decree's terms. 
4. After the divorce, mother earned a nursing assistant certificate and now has an 
adjusted gross income from work at a care center in the amoW1t $2513 per month. 
5. Father either has a bachelor's degree in botany or is only a couple of credits away. He 
testified he did not know if he had the degree. He has worked in the past as a floor installer and 
currently supervises shooting range installation. He and his new wife represented his adjusted 
gross income ("AGI") as $2000 per month working for Steelcoat, a shooting range installation 
company which father and his new wife claim she started and owns. The company has receipts 
of several hWldred thousand dollars per year before expenses. Father started living with his new 
wife in 2011 and married her in 2013. A registration in the new wife's name was filed for 
Steelcoat in 2011. Steelcoat does the same kind of work father was doing before he started living 
with his new wife. It also serves father's principal prior customer, Action Target. The new wife 
states she earns $30,000 per year from Steelcoat after paying other employees. She has a full 
time job for Maverik earning $12 per hour. Father has not filed a tax return for tax year 2014. 
6. Father filed a tax return for 2009 showing AGI of$6278. He filed a 2010 return 
showing AGI of $6343. He presented a 2011 return showing AGI of $8,887, and a 2012 and 
2013 return showing $15,835 and $22465 respectively. These latter two returns are incomplete 
as the second pages of the forms 1040 are missing and there is thus no signature. Father's 2013 
return contains a Schedule C listing $173,564 gross paid to him from Action Target and Valient 
Products but also about $162,000 in business expenses. A 2014 W-2 form from Steelcoat shows 
wages of$10826 and a form 1099-misc shows payments of $16,500 from Steelcoat to father. 
Father also produced paystubs for July 2014 through July 2015 from Steelcoat. 
7. Regarding ownership of Steelcoat, the new wife stated she formed the company in 
2011 "with [father's] help." Wife did not file a 2014 tax return and Schedule C for herself and 
Steelcoat. In about October, 2013, Action Target and Valient quit invoicing father and started 
invoicing Steelcoat for the same type of services indicated in the invoices to him personally. Of 
note, father did not produce invoices from Action Target for dates after August, 2014, more than 
a year ago. The new wife was unable to identify Steelcoat's tax year but father knew exactly 
what it was. She claimed she talked to Action Target's installation director, but he later testified, 
denied talking to her and testified he only dealt with father. The wife said she works three to 
four hours per day lining up jobs and making reservations for Steelcoat. She works with father to 
bid on projects and keeps books. Father works only at the company full time and his functions 
consist of running the company's projects. Wife stated she pays father's child support out of a 
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Steelcoat account. Father does not appear to pay tax on these funds. Father was much more 
familiar with Steelcoat's operations and financial information than the new wife was. He helped 
her set up the company, which does the same thing he was doing before the company was set up. 
Father is not allowed to have a checking account due to his criminal convictions and he finances 
purchases on a credit card in his mother's name. He also appears to use a Steelcoat credit card 
which his wife says she controls. Based on these factors, the Court finds Steelcoat is marital 
property of father and his new wife but is controlled by him. The Court finds his and his wife's 
testimony on control of the company incredible. 
8. The Court finds father to be incredible. Father failed to provide complete tax records. 
His invoice summary from the company was incomplete and failed to include complete tax 
records, failed to provide his complete invoices or income records from his prior relationship 
with Action Target and failed to provide a complete invoice summary relating to that 
relationship. He also failed to introduce a 2014 return for Steel coat even though the filing date is 
overdue and the finances are not complicated. Father represented in his financial declaration that 
his income is $2000 per month. However, Steelcoat pays his child support of $600 so his income 
would be at least 10% higher than represented. with these pre-tax dollars accounted for. It is 
unrebutted father told his son about one month before trial that if mother would stop pursuing 
him, it would be easier and he would not have to hide things. By "hide" he was referring to 
unreported income because the son was asking him for help with hockey dues. In fact, father has 
a long time practice of dealing in cash and not reporting the income or disclosing amounts to 
mother. Father deals in frequently cash. He paid his son cash for a job and issued no tax forms. 
During his marriage to mother, he generally had large accounts of cash with him. After the 
divorce, on the less-than- frequent occasions when he paid mother money before Office of 
Recovery Services became involved, he paid in cash. His highest reported AGI while married to 
mother was about $41,000. However, in that same tax year, besides always having large amounts 
of cash from his business, he was able to pay travel expenses and team fees for his sons' hockey, 
as well as for other's children. These sums amounted to at least well over $15,000 per year-he 
was not only paying his but other children's expenses to ensure there was a team. He was able to 
afford an illegal drug habit and the Court has never found a methamphetamine dealer ta.lees 
anything but cash. He cannot have a checking account because of past forgery and thus deals in 
cash when not using his mother's credit card. His crimes of moral turpitude impeach his 
testimony under Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Father's evasive demeanor on the 
stand regarding income and the business did not inspire confidence in his truthfulness. . 
9. The Court finds mother credible as she supported her income testimony with pay 
stubs, a W-2 form and a 2014 tax return. There was no significant impeachment evidence 
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regarding her testimony and her income amount was undisputed. Her AGI is $30040 from her 
form 1040. Divided by 12 her monthly income is $2503. 
10. Father failed to file tax returns in 2006,2007 and 2008. During this time he was 
acting out on a major addiction to methamphetamine and according to his testimony committed 
self-destruction of his earning capacity. He was convicted of felonies in connection with his 
choice to become a drug addict. He was "fired" by the casino where he was working because of 
his criminal activity. He was barred from working as a contractor for Action Target on a military 
installation because he chose activities that gave him a criminal record.. However, he could 
work on all the other Action Target projects. The Court finds father makes much more than 
$2000 per month and does not report part of his income which consists of cash payments and is 
thus "hidden" as he told his son. Further, father admittedly was making over $41,000 during the 
marriage but destroyed his earning capacity for a time. Father claims he only makes $11 per hour 
from Steelcoat but has not hunted for a better paying job in at least the past two years. Father is 
voluntarily underemployed due to drug use and failure to look for a better job, although he is also 
making cash money on the side doing floor installations according to his son. 
11. Father has current monthly expenses of $2545. Father claimed obligation for the 
mortgage on the home mother lives in but is not paying the mortgage and that claim is therefore 
irrelevant. He listed it as a debt, which it is, but not a monthly expense on his latest financial 
declaration. The Court does not include mother's mortgage as an expense for father in 
determining alimony below. Father gets health insurance from his new wife's employer. He also 
shares expenses with his new wife. In fact, many family expenses are paid out of the Steelcoat 
account, thus reducing father's expenses. Father has not provided documentary backup for his 
claimed expenses. This is particularly noteworthy because father argued mother should not be 
allowed expenses because her documentary backup was incomplete under Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 
UT 79, ,r 100, _ P.3d_. In making this argument, father ignored the identical deficiency in 
his documentation. The only backup documents he provided were expenses reflected in the bank 
records of Steelcoat and thus were the company's expenses, not his. Wife provided more 
documentation than he did. 
12. Mother's reasonable monthly expenses are approximately $4400 taking out the 
amount spent on adult children, school fees which can be waived and pet care. She is paying the 
mortgage on the home she resides in, an undisputed fact. Nonetheless, although her current 
living style does not match what she enjoyed during the marriage, there are insufficient funds 
after the divorce, as in most divorces, between the parties to allow her to live that lifestyle. There 
was no dispute about the amount of her major expense-her mortgage. She also provided 
personal credit card and bank statements indicating her utility, phone, food and other monthly 
costs. She included expenses that were reasonable, such as a car, insurance and health insurance, 
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even though she does not presently have them but would have them if father paid support. Since 
neither party complied with Dahl to the extent of documenting each expense, although mother 
did better than father on this point, the Court has no choice but to rely to a certain extent on their 
uncorroborated testimonies to establish expenses. 
13. Mother's commendable increase in income constitutes a material change in 
circumstances. Thus she can cover more of her expenses than at the date of divorce. Regarding 
father's income, during marriage father was capable of making $41,317 in W-2 income in 2004 
before he began abusing drugs and $20,000 in off the record cash based on the amount he was 
paying for hockey and still being able to carry around large sums of cash. Father's confessed 
hiding of income and Steelcoat's paying for at least some expenses makes his now-professed 
income of $2000 per month unreliable. His failure to provide complete wage records and 
concealment causes the Court to calculate a wage using reason and father's past practices. Also, 
it is apparent the amount in the decree was based on pre-expense revenue and thus must be 
adjusted to what he is currently capable of making. It is equitable that the Court find him 
voluntarily underemployed and capable of making $61,317 per annum as of 2004--his AGI in his 
tax return plus a minimum of $20,000 of unreported cash, again based on large hockey payments 
and his carrying large sums of cash from his contractor jobs. It is equitable this amount be 
adjusted for wage inflation to $79,948 in 2014 using the Social Security Wage Index calculator. 
This is necessary due to father again failing to produce current and complete evidence of his 
wages. His imputed income on monthly basis is thus $6662. 
14. Father is in arrears on child support and alimony. The Office of Recovery services 
has a record of his arrears. Mother is the primary custodial parent. Mother is unable to live at 
anywhere near her pre-divorce state without alimony. The decree entitled her to alimony for 19 
years and her need has worsened due to father's failure to pay any alimony, and only a portion of 
child support. This has forced her to sell off her jewelry, furniture and other assets to try to keep 
up on expenses. She has had to receive Church welfare. She is unable to meet her needs and 
those of her minor children without much more help than that which husband is paying 
involuntarily through ORS. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
15. Imputation of income involves "determining whether the [spouse] is voluntarily ... 
underemployed and ifso, how much income ought to be imputed." Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT 
App 269, ,r 7. The underemployed situation arises when a spouse "intentionally chooses of his 
or her own free will to become ... underemployed." Id. citing Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 
16, ,r 16, 272 P .3d 748. Father claims he lost his job and ability to work due to drug abuse and 
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financial crimes. But he can point to no sustained attempt, and no attempt whatsoever in the last 
two years, to make "reasonable efforts to obtain employment at a pay rate comparable to his 
former employment." Id., 18. Father gave no excuse for his failure to better his employment 
beyond complaining he could not get hired because he is a felon. But his former employer 
indicated that was not an impediment to them employing him and the Court takes notice he has 
been able to get some charges reduced to misdemeanors. 
16. Where modification is sought by a spouse, it must be shown the spouse "has not 
caused or contributed to the existence of the grounds for which modification is sought." 
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 438 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah 1968). Thus, where the spouse causes the loss in 
income as a direct consequence of to his own misconduct-abusing drugs and forgery or theft in 
this case-he is not entitled to be excused from paying child support based on his new 
circumstances. SeeProctorv. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah App 1989). The same 
reasoning applies to alimony. In short, father cannot voluntarily damage his earnings and then 
claim his misconduct excuses him from paying support based on what he was capable of earning, 
or based on imputation of pre-misconduct income. Young v. Young, 2009 UT App 3, 120 fn. 6, 
201 P.3d 301. (C.f. Carlsen v. State Dept. Of Social Services, 772 P.2d 775 (Utah 1986) (child 
support may be collected for periods of incarceration because it was the obligor' s voluntary 
actions that led to time in prison). More recently, McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, 
265 P.3d 839 determined income should not be imputed if the payor spouse is unlikely to get a 
similar job, at least for some time. In the present case, however, father can still do the work he 
was doing before he chose to become a meth addict and McPherson is therefore inapposite. He 
is now in recovery and does not use meth anymore. 
17. Father seeks in essence to set aside the income declared in the decree in 2008 by 
asking the Court for a nunc pro tune order modifying support to the date of the decree. There has 
never been a motion to set aside the decree's provisions under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure in the past six years. However, in order to reach an equitable resolution in this 
case, and in light of the fact father was most certainly not making over $200,000 per year at any 
time, but also taking into account the Court is using inflationary adjustment to impute his current 
income, the Court will select a middle ground and set the effective date of the income found 
herein to the date of the divorce decree, September 5, 2008. The Court does this even though 
the time limits under rule 60(b) have long expired. The Court sees no obligation to do this as 
father did nothing about the decree until just before trial, and did not make consistent payments 
of any amount for three years-- and still has not after filing the petition to modify. The Court 
emphasizes it is taking into account the fact it is adjusting and reducing father's imputed income 
for inflation now but applying that figure beginning in 2008 rather than now. This approach 
benefits father but sanctions him for his lack of diligence, good faith and failure to support his 
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children and former spouse notwithstanding his ability to do so. His arrearages may be adjusted 
by ORS accordingly. 
18. Under Utah Code § 30-3-5 (2005), the trial court must consider, at a minimum, the 
following factors in determining alimony: ( 1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; (2) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (3) the ability of the 
payor spouse to provide support; (4) the length of the marriage; (5) whether the recipient spouse 
has custody of minor children requiring support; ( 6) whether the recipient spouse worked in a 
business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and (7) whether the recipient spouse directly 
contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the 
payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. §30-3-5-(8). 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(8)(b) allows the trier of fact to consider fault when awarding 
alimony. Mother was already awarded alimony in the decree. The only issue now is 
modification. Father is ordered to pay alimony in the amount in the decree from the date of the 
decree to the date of the petition to modify. Based on father's imputed income, he can pay 
mother $1900 per month in alimony to cover the gap between her income and reasonable 
monthly expenses and still cover his reasonable monthly expenses with income to spare. Father 
is ordered to pay alimony in the amount just stated from date of the decree and 19 years 
thereafter. 
19. The parties stipulated ORS will accept the start date the Court orders for alimony and 
child support. That date will start at the date of the divorce decree and arrearages based on that 
date. The parties stipulated child support will be based on the guidelines. Father is so far 
behind, having paid only the most minimal payments, that mother will be entitled to a judgment 
for arrearages. However, a judgment will be entered separately so ORS does not commingle its 
collections with the judgment, pursuant to stipulation of the parties. Further, the arrearages will 
have to be adjusted for children graduating from minority over the years. 
20. A trial court may award attorney fees and costs in divorce proceedings. Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-3 (Supp. 2002); see Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44. ,Il8, 19 P. 19 P.3d 
1005. "The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. However, the trial court must base the award on evidence of the 
receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
requested fees." Id. Thus, "an [attorney fee] award must be based on sufficient findings."/d. In 
this case, the Court concludes although father has been able to get support and income modified 
from the decree, his hiding of income and failure to be forthcoming with complete records make 
it inequitable to award him attorneys fees. Further, he did not obtain nearly the results he 
desired-basically validation of his claim that he only makes about $11 per hour. Those same 
factors would allow an award to mother under the bad faith provision in title 78 of the Utah Code 
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annotated. U.C.A. §78B-5-825. Further, since father has not been paying adequate alimony or 
child support, mother cannot afford attorneys fees but father has the ability to pay them and thus 
mother is awarded fees under Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-3. 
21. Counsel for mother is requested to incorporate the Court's findings and conclusions 
into a modified decree and submit it to father's counsel for review. Counsel may obtain an 
electronic draft of these findings and conclusions from the Court's law clerk to facilitate drafting 
the modified decree. Counsel must file an updated child support worksheet, but for one child the 
Court shows the amount of support being $715 per month (for the remaining child). Counsel will 
have to check this figure and adjust past support arrearages for the number of children and dates 
when their minority ended, or have ORS do it The Court does not have information on high 
school graduation dates. The stipulation of the parties appears to contemplate that calculation can 
be made in cooperation with ORS with an effective date of September 5, 2008. Counsel should 
try to submit the modified decree within 15 days hereof under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court appreciates counsel's courtesy in this contentious matter. 
Dated this 10th day of November 2015 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
L YNESSA MICHELLE ANDERSON, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
LOREN PRICE ANDERSON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 084400367 
Judge: SAMUEL D. MCVEY 
The Petitioner, L YNESSA MICHELLE ANDERSON, and Respondent, LOREN PRICE 
ANDERSON, had a bench trial to hear the issues regarding Respondent's Petition to Modify on 
October 23, 2015, in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah. At trial, 
the Court heard testimony, received exhibits, and considered the arguments of counsel regarding, 
among other things, child support and alimony resolving all issues of Respondent's Petition to 
Modify, and the Court having previously entered its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and restated herein: 
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NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS 
GROUNDS AND JURISDICTION 
I. The above referenced Court entered a Decree of Divorce in this matter on or about 
September 5, 2008. 
2. The above referenced court has continuing jurisdiction over this matter. 
3. The Court has found that there has been a material and substantial change in 
circumstance allowing the Court to modify the Parties' Decree of Divorce pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Section 30-3-34. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
4. The Court finds that a September 5, 2008 Decree of Divorce in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court dissolved the parties' 19-year marriage. The parties had four minor children at the 
time. Father was in and out of jail for illegal drug abuse, fraud, theft and forgery around this 
time, was served with the summons petition for divorce, accepted service and did not answer the 
summons. Mother's counsel obtained a certificate of default and subsequently a default 
judgment. 
5. The Court finds that Father did not file tax returns for tax years 2006-2008. Mother 
subpoenaed pay records from the casino where father worked as a contractor and obtained and a 
2007 IRS form l 099 showing father received an average of $18,271 per month. Her attorney 
verified the form l 099 information by affidavit. The decree listed father's income in that amount. 
It imputed $1,014 per month to mother in that she was a stay at home parent during the marriage. 
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6. The Court finds that based on this income father was assessed child support of $2,945 
per month and alimony of $2,719 per month for 19 years. There is now only one minor child so 
the child support is now less under the decree's terms. 
7. The Court finds that after the divorce, mother earned a nursing assistant certificate and 
now has an adjusted gross income from work at a care center in the amount $2,513 per month. 
8. The Court finds that Father either has a bachelor's degree in botany or is only a couple 
credits away He testified he did not know if he had the degree. He has worked in the past as a 
floor installer and currently supervises shooting range installation. He and his new wife 
represented his adjusted gross income ("AGI") as $2,000 per month working for Steelcoat, a 
shooting range installation company which father and his new wife claim she stated and owns. 
The company has receipts of several hundred thousand dollars per year before expenses. Father 
started living with his new wife in 2011 and married her in 2013. A registration in the wife's 
name was filed for Steelcoat in 2011. Steelcoat does the same kind of work father was doing 
before he started living with his new wife. It also serves father's principal prior customer, Action 
Target. The new wife states she earns $30,000 per year from Steelcoat after paying other 
employees. She has a full time job for Maverik earning $12 per hour. Father has not filed a tax 
return for tax year 2014. 
9. The Court finds that Father filed a tax return for 2009 showing AGI of $6,278. He filed 
a 2010 return showing AGI of $6,343. He presented a 2011 return showing AGI of $8,887, and a 
2012 and 2013 return showing $15,835 and $22,465 respectively. These latter two returns are 
incomplete as the second pages of the forms 1040 are missing and there is this no signature. 
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Father's 2013 return contains a Schedule C listing $173,564 gross paid to him from Action 
Target and Valient Products but also about $162,000 in business expenses. A 2014 W-2 form 
from Steelcoat shows wages of $10,826 and a form I 099-misc shows payments of $16,500 from 
Steelcoat to father. Father also produced paystubs for July 2014 through July 2015 from 
Steelcoat. 
I 0. The Court finds that regarding ownership of Steelcoat, the new wife stated she 
formed the company in 2011 "with [father's] help." Wife did not file a 2014 tax return and 
Schedule C for herself and Steelcoat. In about October, 2013, Action Target and Valient quit 
invoicing father and started invoicing Steelcoat for the same type of services indicated in the 
invoiced to him personally. Of note, father did not produce invoices from Action Target for dates 
after August, 2014, more than a year ago. The new wife was unable to identify Steelcoat's tax 
year but father knew exactly what it was. She claimed she talked to Action Target's installation 
director, but he later testified, denied talking to her and testified he only dealt with father. The 
wife said she works three to four hours per day lining up jobs and making reservations for 
Steelcoat. She works with father to bid on projects and keep books. Father works only at the 
company full time and his functions consist of running the company's projects. Wife stated she 
pays father's child support out of a Steelcoat account. Father does nto appear to pay tax on these 
funds. Father was much more familiar with Steelcoat's operations and financial information than 
the new wife was. He helped her set up the company, which does the same thing he was doing 
before the company was set up. Father is not allowed to have a checking account due to his 
criminal convictions and he finances purchases on a credit card in his mother's name. He also 
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appears to use a Steelcoat credit card which his wife says she controls. Based on these factors, 
the Court finds Steelcoat is marital property of father and his new wife but is controlled by him. 
The Court finds his and his wife's testimony on control of the company incredible. 
11. The Court finds father to be incredible. Father failed to provide complete tax records. 
His invoice summary from the company was incomplete and failed to include complete tax 
records, failed to provide his complete invoices or income records from his prior relationship 
with Action Target and failed to provide a complete invoice summary relating to that 
relationship. He also failed to introduce a 2014 return for Steelcoar even though the filing date is 
overdue and the finances are not complicated. Father represented in his financial declaration that 
his income is $2,000 per month. However, Steelcoat pays his child support of $600 so his 
income would be at least I 0% higher than represented with these pre-tax dollars accounted for. It 
is unrebutted father told his son about one month before trial that if mother would stop pursuing 
him, it would be easier and he would not have to hide things. By "hide" he was referring to 
unreported income because the son was asking him for help with hockey dues. In fact, father has 
a long time practice of dealing in cash and not reporting the income or disclosing amount to 
mother. Father deals in frequently cash. He paid his son ash for a job and issues no tax forms. 
During his marriage to mother, he generally had large accounts of cash with him. After the 
divorce, on the less-than- frequent occasions when he paid mother money before Office of 
Recovery Services became involved, he paid in cash. His highest reported AGI while married to 
mother was about $41,000. However, in that same tax year, besides always having large amounts 
of cash from his business, he was able to pay travel expenses and team fees for his sons' hockey, 
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as well as for other's children. These sums amounted to at least well over $15,000 per year-he 
was not only paying his but other children's expenses to ensure there was a team. He was able to 
afford an illegal drug habit and the Court has never found a methamphetamine dealer takes 
anything but cash. He cannot have a checking account because of past forgery and thus deals in 
cash when not using his mother's credit card. His crimes of moral turpitude impeach his 
testimony under Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Father's evasive demeanor on the stand 
regarding income and the business did not inspire confidence in his truthfulness. 
12. The Court finds mother credible as she supported her income testimony with pay 
stubs, a W-2 form and a 2014 tax return. There was not significant impeachment evidence 
regarding her testimony and her income amount was undisputed. Her AGI is $30,040 from her 
form 1040. Divided by 12 her monthly income is $2,503. 
I 3. The Court finds that Father failed to file tax returns for 2006, 2007 and 2008. During 
this time he was acting out on a major addiction to methamphetamine and according to his 
testimony committed self-destruction of his earning capacity. He was convicted of felonies in 
connection with his choice to become a drug addict. He was "fired" by the casino where he was 
working because of his criminal activity. He was barred from working as a contractor for Action 
Target on a military installation because he chose activities that have him a criminal record. 
However, he could work on all other Action Target projects. The Court finds father makes much 
more than $2,000 per month and does not report part if his income which consists of cash 
payments and is thus "hidden" as he told his son. Further, father admittedly was making over 
$41,000 during the marriage but destroyed his earning capacity for a time. Father claims he only 
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makes $1 I per hour from Steelcoat but has not hunted for a better paying job in at least the past 
two years. Father is voluntarily underemployed due to drug use and failure to look for a better 
job although he is also making cash money on the side doing floor installation according to his 
son. 
14. The Court finds that Father has current monthly expenses of $2,545. Father claimed 
obligation for the mortgage on the home mother lives in but is not paying the mortgage and that 
claim is therefore irrelevant. He listed it as a debt, which it is, but not a monthly expense on his 
latest financial declaration. The Court does not include mother's mortgage as an expense for 
father in determining alimony below. Father gets health insurance from his new wife's employer. 
He also shares expenses with his new wife. In fact, many family expenses are paid out of the 
Steelcoat account, thus reducing father's expenses. Father has not provided documentary backup 
for his claimed expenses. This is particularly noteworthy because father argued mother should 
not be allowed expenses because he documentary backup was incomplete under Dahl v. Dahl, 
2015 UT 791 I 00, _ P.3d _. In making this argument, father ignored the identical deficiency 
in his documentation. The only backup documents he provided were expenses reflected in the 
bank records of Steelcoat and thus were the company's expenses, not his. Wife provided more 
documentation than he did. 
15. The Court finds that Mother's reasonable monthly expenses are approximately $4,400 
taking out the amount spent on adult children, school fees which can be waived and pet care. She 
is paying the mortgage on the home she resides in, an undisputed fact. Nonetheless, although her 
current living style does not match what she enjoyed during the marriage, there are insufficient 
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funds after the divorce, as in most divorce, between the parties to allow her to live that lifestyle. 
There was no dispute about the amount of her major expense-her mortgage. She also provided 
personal credit card and bank statements indicating her utility, phone, food and other monthly 
costs. She included expenses that were reasonable, such as a car, insurance and health insurance, 
even though she does not presently have them but would have them if father paid support. Since 
neither party complied with Dahl to the extent of documenting each expenses, although mother 
did better than father on this point, the Court has no choice but to rely to a certain extent on their 
uncorroborated testimonies to establish expenses. 
16. The Court finds that Mother's commendable increase in income constitutes a material 
change in circumstances. This she can cover more of her expenses than at the date of divorce. 
Regarding father's income, during the marriage father was capable of making $41,317 in W-2 
income in 2004 before he began abusing drugs and $20,000 in off the record cash based on the 
amount he was paying for hockey and still being able to carry around large sums of cash. 
Father's confessed hiding of income and Steelcoat's paying for at least some expenses makes his 
now-professed income of $2,000 unreliable. His failure to provide complete wage records and 
concealment causes the Court to calculate a wage using reason and father's past practices. Also, 
it is apparent the amount in the decree was based on pre-expense revenue and thus must be 
adjusted to what he is currently capable of making. It is equitable that the court find him 
voluntarily underemployed and capable of making $61,317 per annum as of2004-his AGI in 
his tax return plus a minimum of $20,000 of unreported cash, again based on large hockey 
payments and his carrying large sums of cash from his contractor jobs. It is equitable this amount 
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be adjusted for wage inflation to $79,948 in 2014 using the Social Security Wage Index 
calculator. This is necessary due to father again failing to produce current and complete evidence 
of his wages. His imputed income on monthly basis is thus $6,662. 
17. The Court finds that Father is in arrears on child support and alimony. The Office of 
Recovery services has a record of his arrears. Mother is the primary custodial parent. Mother is 
unable to love at anywhere near her pre-divorce state without alimony. The decree entitled her to 
alimony for 19 years and her need has worsened due to father's failure to pay any alimony, and 
only a portion of child support. This has forced her to sell off her jewelry, furniture and other 
assets to try to keep up on expenses. She has had to receive church welfare. She is unable to meet 
her needs and those of her minor children without much more help than that which husband is 
paying involuntarily through ORS. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following conclusions of law: 
18. Imputation of income involves "determining whether the [spouse] is voluntarily ... 
underemployed and if so, how much income out to be imputed. Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 
269, ,r 7. The underemployed situation arises when a spouse "intentionally chooses of his own or 
her own free will to become ... underemployed." Id. citing Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, 
,r 16,272 P.3d 748. Father claims he lost his job and ability to work due to drug abuse and 
financial crimes. But he can point to no sustained attempt, and no attempt whatsoever in the last 
two years, to make "reasonable efforts to obtain employment at a pay rate comparable to his 
former employment." Id, ,r 8. Father gave no excuse for his failure to better his employment 
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beyond complaining he could not her hired because he is a felon. But his former employer 
indicated that was not an impediment to them employing him and the Court takes notice he has 
been able to get some charges reduced to misdemeanors. 
19. Where modification is sought by a spouse, it must be shown the spouse "has not 
caused or contributed to the existence of the grounds for which modification is sought." 
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 438 P.2d 108, 181 (Utah 1968). Thus, where the spouse causes the loss in 
income as a direct consequence ofto his own misconduct-abusing drugs and forgery or theft in 
this case-he is not entitled to be excused from paying child support based on his new 
circumstances. See, Proctorv. Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah App 1989). The same 
reasoning applied to alimony. In short, father cannot voluntarily damage his earning and then 
claim his misconduct excuses him from paying support based on what he was capable of earning, 
or based on imputation of pre-misconduct income. Young v. Young, 2009 UT App 3, ,r 20 fn. 6, 
201 P.3d 301. (Cf Carlsen v. State Dept. of Social Services, 772 P.2d 775 (Utah 1986) (child 
support may be collected for periods of incarceration because it was the obligor's voluntary 
actions that led to time in prison). More recently, McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, 
265 P.3d 839 determined income should not be imputed if the payor spouse is unlikely to get a 
similar job, at least for some time. In the present case, however, father can still do the work he 
was doing before he chose to become a meth addict and McPherson is therefore inapposite. He is 
now in recovery and does not use meth anymore. 
20. Father seeks in essence to set aside the income declared in the decree in 2008 by 
asking the court for a nunc pro tune order modifying support to the date of the decree. There has 
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never been a motion to set aside the decree's provisions under rule 60(b) of the Utah rules of 
Civil Procedure in the past six years. However, in order to reach an equitable resolution in this 
case, and in light of the fact father was most certainly not making over $200,000 per year at any 
time, but also taking into account the Court is using inflationary adjustment to impute his current 
income, the court will select a middle ground and set the effective date of the income found 
herein to the date of the divorce decree, September 5, 2008. The Court does this even though the 
limits under rule 60(b) have long expired. The Court sees no obligation to do this as father did 
nothing about the decree until just before trial, and did not make consistent payments of any 
amount for three years-and still has not after filing the petition to modify. The Court 
emphasizes it is taking into account the fact it is adjusting and reducing father's imputed income 
for inflation now but applying that figure beginning in 2008 rather than now. This approach 
benefits father but sanctions him for his lack of diligence, good faith and failure to support his 
children and former spouse notwithstanding his ability to do so. His arrearages may be adjusted 
by ORS accordingly. 
21. Under Utah Code Section 30-3-5 (2005), the trial court must consider, at a minimum, 
the following factors in determining alimony: ( l) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; (2) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (3) the ability 
of the payor spouse to provide support; (4) the length of the marriage; (5) whether the recipient 
spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; ( 6) whether the recipient spouse worked 
in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and (7) whether the recipient spouse 
directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received 
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by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. Section 
30-3-5-(8). Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(8)(b) allows the trier of fact to consider fault 
when awarding alimony. Mother was already awarded alimony in the decree. The only issue now 
is modification. Father is ordered to pay alimony in the amount in the decree from the date of the 
decree to the date of the petition to modify. Based on father's imputed income, he can pay 
mother $1,900 per month in alimony to cover the gap between her income and reasonable 
monthly expenses and still cover his reasonable monthly expenses with income to spare. Father 
is ordered to pay alimony in the amount just stated from date if the decree and 19 years 
thereafter. 
22. The parties stipulated ORS will accept the start date the Court orders for alimony and 
child support. That date will start at the date of the divorce decree and arrearages based on that 
date. The parties stipulated child support will be based on the guidelines. Father is so far behind, 
having paid only the most minimal payments, that mother will be entitled to a judgment for 
arrearages. However, a judgment will be entered separately so ORS does not commingle its 
collections with the judgment, pursuant to stipulation of the parties. Further, the arrearages will 
have to be adjusted for children graduating from minority over the years. 
23. A trial court may award attorney's fees and costs in divorce proceedings. Utah Code 
Ann. Section 30-3-3 (Supp. 2002); see Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 200 l UT App. 44. ,rt 8, 19 P .3d 
1005. "The decision to award attorney fees and the amount thereof rests primarily in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. However, the trial court must base the award on evidence of the 
receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the 
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requested fees." Id. Thus, "an [attorney fee] award must be based on sufficient findings." Id. In 
this case, the Court concludes although father has been able to get support and income modified 
from the decree, his hiding of income and failure to be forthcoming with complete records make 
it inequitable to award him attorneys fees. Further, he did not obtain nearly the results he desired 
-basically validation of his claim that he only makes about $ I I per hour. Those same factors 
would allow an award to mother under the bad faith provision un title 78 of the Utah Code 
annotated. U.C.A. Section 78B-5-825. Further, since father has not been paying adequate 
alimony or child support, other cannot afford attorneys fees but father has the ability to pay them 
and thus mother is awarded feeds under Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-3. 
24. Counsel for mother is requested to incorporate the Court's findings and conclusions 
into a modified decree and submit it to father's counsel for review. Counsel may obtain an 
electronic draft of these findings and conclusions from the Court's law clerk to facilitate drafting 
the modified decree. Counsel must file an updated child support worksheet, but for one child the 
Court shows the amount of support being $7 I 5 per month ( for the remaining child). Counsel will 
have to check this figure and adjust past support arrearages for the number of children and dated 
when their minority ended, or have ORS do it. The court does not have information on high 
school graduation dates. The stipulation of the parties appears to contemplate that calculation can 
be made in cooperation with ORS with an effective date of September 5, 2008. Counsel should 
try to submit the modified decree within 15 days hereof under Rule 7 of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Court appreciates counsel's courtesy in this contentious matter. 
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MODIFICATION 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court orders that following 
modifications be made and the Decree of Divorce is hereby modified. All other provisions of the 
parties' original Decree of Divorce not herein modified shall remain in full force and effect. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
25. Child support shall be based on Petitioner having sole custody of the parties' four (4) 
minor children from the date of the Decree of Divorce. The parties' monthly income is imputed 
to $2,503 for Petitioner and $6,662.00 for Respondent. 
26. Respondent shall pay ongoing child support to the Petitioner, beginning on October 
24, 2015, in the amount of $714.64 per month, this amount is based on the Court's stated income 
for the parties and Petitioner having sole custody of the Parties' one (1) minor child. 
27. The Parties' incomes as stated by the Court shall be used to calculate and adjust 
Respondent's child support obligation in arrears back-dated to the time of the entry of the 
Parties' Decree of Divorce. 
28. Petitioner is awarded a judgement for the entire balance of child support in arrears, 
owed through October 23, 2015, in a total of $55,901.09. See, Exhibit (Filed separately with the 
Court). This judgement in arrears was calculated by taking Respondent's total obligation from 
the date of the Decree of Divorce on September 5, 2008, through the date of trial on October 23, 
2015. The monthly child support obligation was adjusted each time a minor child emancipated 
and support for the child terminated. Three children have emancipated since the Decree of 
Divorce was entered. The three children that have emancipated did so in May 2009, May 2010 
0833 
May 23, 2016 08:33 PM 14 of 17 
vu 
and May 2013, respectively. The child support payments during each period were $1,446.73, 
$1,297.70, $ I, 139.94, and is now $714.64 with one (1) minor child remaining. After the total 
child support obligation was calculated Respondent's total payments as reported by the Office of 
Recovery Services was applied to the total obligation leaving an outstanding balance of arrears. 
See, Exhibit l (filed separately with the court). 
ALIMONY 
29. Respondent shall pay Petitioner in the amount of $1,900 per month from the time the 
Decree of Divorce was entered. This monthly payment shall be made for a period of nineteen 
( 19) years. The final date for alimony shall be September 5, 2027. See, Exhibit 2 (Filed 
separately with the Court). Judgment for alimony arrears from the date the Decree of Divorce 
was entered on September 5, 2008 through October 23, 2015, the date of trial in this matter is set 
forth in paragraph 30 of this Order. Beginning October 24, 2015, the Respondent shall pay 
alimony to the Petitioner each month as ordered herein. 
30. Petitioner is awarded a judgment for alimony in arrears of$152,689.90 through 
October 23, 2015. This amount reflects all alimony from September 5, 2008, until the date of 
trial on October 23, 2015. Id. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
31. Steelcoat is marital property of Respondent and his current spouse but is controlled 
by Respondent. 
32. Respondent has met the requirements under bad faith provision of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78B-5-825. Therefore, Petitioner is awarded her attorney's fees in accordance with Utah 
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Code Ann. Section 30-3-3. 
33. Petitioner's Attorney is awarded a judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of 
$16,403.44 as stated in Petitioner's Affidavit of Attorney's Fees. 
SO ORDERED 
SIGNED BY THE COURT 
As indicated by the electronic signature and seal atop page 1 
Honorable Judge SAMUEL D. MCVEY 
Fourth District Court 
Notice Pursuant to Rule 7(i)(4}-(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
TO THE RESPONDENT: Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 70)(4}-{5) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure of the District Courts of the State of Utah, that this Order prepared by 
Petitioner's counsel shall be the Order of the Court unless you notify Petitioner's counsel with 
proposed changes or you file an objection in writing within seven (7) days from the date of the 
service of this notice. 
Dated: April I 9, 2016 
APPROVED TO FORM: 
Rosemond G. Blakelock 
Attorney for Respondent 
Isl C{,yri.,y Wo..lk&t: 
Chris Walker 
Attorney General 
May 23, 2016 08:33 PM 
ls/JUL L. CQw 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of April, 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by the method indicated below, to the following: 
Rosemond G. Blakelock 
589 West 800 North 
Orem, Utah 84057 
rose@blakelocklaw.com 
Chris Walker 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
150 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 
chriswalker@utah.gov 
( )U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( )Hand Delivered 
( )Facsimile Transmission 
( X)EFILE 
( )Overnight Mail 
( )U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( )Hand Delivered 
( )Facsimile Transmission 
( X )EFILE 
( )Overnight Mail 
Isl SeiPNa;Jv 
May 23, 2016 08:33 PM 
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e § 30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees--Temporary alimony, UT ST§ 30-3-3 
KeyCite Yellow Flag- Negative Treatment 
• Proposed Legislation 
• 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 30. Husband and Wife 
Chapter 3. Divorce (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A 1953 § 30-3-3 
§ 30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees--Temporary alimony 
Currentness 
e (1 ) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7, 
Part l , Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, 
or division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, 
including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order 
may include provision for costs of the action . 
• 
• 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim 
or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is 
impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees . 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (l), the court may order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the 
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other party. 
t (4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be amended during the course 
of the action or in the final order or judgment. 
• 
• 
Credits 
Laws 1993, c. 137, § l ; Laws 2001 , c. 255, § 3, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 44, eff. Feb. 7, 2008 . 
Notes of Decisions (319) 
U .C.A. 1953 § 30-3-3, UT ST§ 30-3-3 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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J ?i KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 30. Husband and Wife 
Chapter 3. Divorce (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A 1953 § 30-3-5 
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and 
children--Division of debts--Court to have continuingjurisdiction--Custody and 
parent-tirne--Detennination of alimony--Nonmeritorious petition for modification 
Currentness 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, 
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-
insurance, and deductibles; 
(b )(i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, hospital, or dental 
insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any 
time a dependent child is covered by both parents' health, hospital, or dental insurance plans; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the e 
parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, 
obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services; and 
(e) if either party owns a life insurance policy or an annuity contract, an acknowledgment by the court that the owner: 
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(i) has reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the list of beneficiaries; 
(ii) has affirmed that those listed as beneficiaries are in fact the intended beneficiaries after the divorce becomes 
final; and 
(iii) understands that if no changes are made to the policy or contract, the beneficiaries currently listed will receive 
any funds paid by the insurance company under the terms of the policy or contract. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training 
of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and 
their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as 
is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and father after entry of 
e the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
(5)(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the 
immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child . 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an order 
establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter . 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the 
court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent 
or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the 
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
WESTLAW GD 2016 Thornson Reuters f\Jo cla1rn to original U S. Govsrnrnenr 'Norks. 2 
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of ... , UT ST § 30-3-5 
·-----··-~------·------ ------------
---------- _____ ..___________ _ 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for 
education received by the payor spouse or enabling the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award alimony and the terms thereof. 
(c) "Fault" means any of the following wrongful conduct during the marriage that substantially contributed to the 
breakup of the marriage relationship: 
(i) engaging in sexual relations with a person other than the party's spouse; 
(ii) knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause physical harm to the other party or minor children; 
(iii) knowingly and intentionally causing the other party or minor children to reasonably fear life-threatening harm; 
or 
(iv) substantially undermining the financial stability of the other party or the minor children. 
(d) The court may, when fault is at issue, close the proceedings and seal the court records. 
( e) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining 
alimony in accordance with Subsection (S)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable 
principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages 
of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the 
standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(f) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
- ---- ---------------- -----·----------------
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(g) When a marriage oflong duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the spouses 
due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining 
the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses 
during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding 
alimony. 
(h) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born 
during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the 
marriage. 
(i)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on 
a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce . 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did 
not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action . 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as 
provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses . 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct 
justifies that consideration. 
G) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any 
time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony 
for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party 
to the action of annulment and the payor party's rights are determined. 
( l 0) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party 
paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Credits 
Laws 1909, c. 109, § 4; Laws 1969, c. 72, § 3; Laws 1975, c. 81, § l; Laws 1979, c. 110, § 1; Laws 1984, c. 13, § 1; Laws 
1985, c. 72, § l; Laws 1985, c. 100, § 1; Laws 1991 . c. 257, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 152. § I; Laws 1993. c. 26 1, § I; Laws 1994 . 
c. 284. § I; Laws 1995, c. 330, § I, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 232, § 4, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 168, § 1, eff. 
May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 277, §Leff. May 3. 1999; Laws 2001. c. 255, § 4, eff. April 30. 2001; Laws 2003, c. 176, § 3. 
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eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 129, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2010, c. 285, § 1, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 2013, c. 264, 
§ 1, eff. May 14, 2013; Laws 2013, c. 373, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013. 
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 1212; C.L. 1907, § 1212; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. 1933, § 40-3-5; C. 1943, § 40-3-5. 
Notes of Decisions ( 1508) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-5, UT ST§ 30-3-5 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 78B-5-825. Attorney fees-Award where action or defense in ... , UT ST§ 78B-5-825 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 5. Procedure and Evidence 
Part 8. Miscellaneous (Refs & Annas) 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-5-825 
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-27-56 
§ 78B-5-825. Attorney fees--Award where action or defense in bad faith--Exceptions 
Currentness 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1 ), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit ofimpecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (I) . 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 857, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Notes of Decisions (219) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-5-825, UT ST§ 78B-5-825 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
End of Document 1:l 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 78B-12-201. Procedure--Documentation-Stipulation, UT ST§ 78B-12-201 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 12. Utah Child Support Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Calculation and Adjustment 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-12-2O1 
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-45-7.3 
§ 78B-12-2O1. Procedure--Documentation--Stipulation 
Currentness 
( 1) In any matter in which child support is ordered, the moving party shall submit: 
(a) a completed child support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78B-12-203(5); 
( c) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of child support requested is consistent with the guidelines; 
and 
(d) the information required under Subsection (3). 
(2)(a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not available, a verified representation of the 
other party's income by the moving party, based on the best evidence available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only be offered after a copy has been provided to the other party 
in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in an 
administrative proceeding. 
(3) Upon the entry of an order in a proceeding to establish paternity or to establish, modify, or enforce a support order, 
each party shall file identifying information and shall update that information as changes occur with the court that 
conducted the proceeding. 
(a) The required identifying information shall include the person's social security number, driver's license number, 
residential and mailing addresses, telephone numbers, the name, address and telephone number of employers, and any 
other data required by the United States Secretary of Health and Human Services. 
(b) Attorneys representing the office in child support services cases are not required to file the identifying information 
required by Subsection (3)(a). 
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(4) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child support and alimony is adequate under the guidelines if 
the stipulated child support amount or combined amount equals or exceeds the base child support award required by 
• the guidelines. 
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Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1243, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2241, efT. May 5, 2008 . 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-12-201 , UT ST§ 78B-12-201 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reuters . No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 788-12-203. Determination of gross income--lmputed income, UT ST§ 78B-12-203 
KeyCite Yellow Flag- Negative Treatment 
Proposed Legislation 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 12. Utah Child Support Act (Refs & Annos) 
Part 2. Calculation and Adjustment 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-12-203 
Formerly cited as lIT ST§ 78-45-7.5 
§ 78B-12-203. Determination of gross income--Imputed income 
Currentness 
(l) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income from any source, including earned and 
noneamed income sources which may include salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, 
prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital 
gains, Social Security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement 
disability insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. If and only if during the 
time prior to the original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at the parent's 
job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide child support. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program; 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security 
Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, SNAP benefits, or General Assistance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4)(a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary 
expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-
employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to 
the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable 
level may be deducted from gross receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business income determined for 
tax purposes. 
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(S)(a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the 
average gross monthly income . 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or 
employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the court finds 
the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of 
Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns . 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or overemployment 
situation exists . 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7). 
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the parent defaults, 
or, in contested cases, a bearing is held and the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative 
proceeding enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation . 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings as 
derived from employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons 
of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same 
geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics . 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, income shall be imputed at least at 
the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding 
or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis 
for the imputation. 
( d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and the condition is not of a temporary nature: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the amount of income the 
custodial parent can earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the home . 
(8)(a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject ofa child support award nor benefits 
to a minor child in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
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• 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support to 
the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that e 
parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances 
of each case. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1245, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2012, c. 41 , § 13, eff. May 8, 2012. 
Notes of Decisions (74) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-12-203, UT ST§ 78B-12-203 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reuters . No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 788-12-210. Application of guidelines-Use of ordered child ... , UT ST§ 788-12-210 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 12. Utah Child Support Act (Refs & Annas) 
Part 2. Calculation and Adjustment 
U.C.A 1953 § 78B-12-210 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-45-7.2 
§ 78B-12-210. Application of guidelines--Use of ordered child support 
Currentness 
(l) The guidelines in this chapter apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying an award of 
child support entered on or after July l, 1989. 
(2)(a) The guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary 
or permanent child support . 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines, the award 
amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines 
are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section . 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that complying with a provision of the 
guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in 
the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case. If an order rebuts the 
presumption through findings, it is considered a deviated order . 
(4) The following shall be considered deviations from the guidelines, if: 
(a) the order includes a written finding that it is a deviation from the guidelines; 
(b) the guidelines worksheet has: 
(i) the box checked for a deviation; and 
(ii) an explanation as to the reason; or 
(c) the deviation is made because there were more children than provided for in the guidelines table . 
( 5) If the amount in the order and the amount on the guidelines worksheet differ by $10 or more: 
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§ 78B-12-210. Application of guidelines-Use of ordered child ... , UT ST§ 78B-12-210 
(a) the order is considered deviated; and 
(b) the incomes listed on the worksheet may not be used in adjusting support for emancipation. 
(6)(a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of that parent and are not children in common 
to both parties may at the option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting a child support 
award, as provided in Subsection (7). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the base child support award of the respective parents for 
the additional children. The base child support award shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income 
before determining the award in the instant case. 
(7) In a proceeding to adjust or modify an existing award, consideration of natural or adoptive children born after entry 
of the order and who are not in common to both parties may be applied to mitigate an increase in the award but may 
not be applied: 
(a) for the benefit of the obligee if the credit would increase the support obligation of the obligor from the most recent 
order; or 
(b) for the benefit of the obligor if the amount of support received by the obligee would be decreased from the most 
recent order. 
(8)(a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the previous three years, a parent, legal guardian, 
or the office may move the court to adjust the amount of a child support order. 
(b) Upon receiving a motion under Subsection (8)( a), the court shall, taking into account the best interests of the child: 
(i) determine whether there is a difference between the payor's ordered support amount and the payor's support 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
amount that would be required under the guidelines; and I 
(ii) if there is a difference as described in Subsection (8)(b )(i), adjust the payor's ordered support amount to the 
payor's support amount provided in the guidelines if: 
(A) the difference is l 0% or more; 
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature; and 
(C) the order adjusting the payor's ordered support amount does not deviate from the guidelines. 
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(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary for an adjustment under this Subsection (8) . 
(9)(a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust the amount of a child support 
order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances. A change in the base combined child support obligation 
table set forth in Section 78B-12-301 is not a substantial change in circumstances for the purposes of this Subsection (9). 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (9), a substantial change in circumstances may include: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the employment potential and ability of a parent to earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; or 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the support of others. 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into account the best interests of the child: 
(i) determine whether a substantial change has occurred; 
(ii) if a substantial change has occurred, determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% or more between 
the payor's ordered support amount and the payor's support amount that would be required under the guidelines; 
and 
(iii) adjust the payor's ordered support amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines if: 
(A) there is a difference of 15% or more; and 
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature. 
(10) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (8) and (9) shall be included in each child 
support order. 
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Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3. § 1252, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2012, c. 19, § l, etT. March 5, 2012. 
Notes of Decisions (44) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-12-210, UT ST§ 78B-12-210 
Current through 2016 Third Special Session 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos) 
Article VI. Witnesses 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609 
RULE 609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION 
Currentness 
(a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a witness's character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal 
conviction: 
( l) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one 
year, the evidence: 
(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant; 
and 
(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant; and 
(2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be admitted if the court can readily determine that 
establishing the elements of the crime required proving--or the witness's admitting-a dishonest act or false statement. 
(b) Limit on Using the Evidence Mter 10 Years. This subdivision (b) applies if more than 10 years have passed since the 
witness's conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible only if: 
its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and 
the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair 
opportunity to contest its use. 
(c) Effect of a Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible if: 
(l) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding that the person has been rehabilitated, and the person has not been convicted of a later 
crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year; or 
(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of 
innocence. 
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( d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of a juvenile adjudication is admissible under this rule only if: 
(1) it is offered in a criminal case; 
(2) the adjudication was of a witness other than the defendant; 
(3) an adult's conviction for that offense would be admissible to attack the adult's credibility; and 
(4) admitting the evidence is necessary to fairly determine guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of an Appeal. A conviction that satisfies this rule is admissible even if an appeal is pending. Evidence of 
the pendency is also admissible. 
Credits 
[ Amended effective October 1, 1992; December 1, 2011.] 
Editors' Notes 
2011 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The language of this rule has been amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily 
understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic 
only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and changes Utah law by granting the court discretion in convictions not involving 
dishonesty or false statement to refuse to admit the evidence if it would be prejudicial to the defendant. Current Utah 
law mandates the admission of such evidence. State v. Bennett, 30 Utah 2d 343,517 P.2d 1029 (1973); State v. Van Dam, 
554 P.2d 1324 (Utah 1976); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980). 
There is presently no provision in Utah law similar to Subsection (d). 
The pendency of an appeal does not render a conviction inadmissible. This is in accord with Utah case law. State v. 
Crawford, 60 Utah 6,206 P. 717 (1922). 
This rule is identical to Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The 1990 amendments to the federal rule made 
two changes in the rule. The comment to the federal rule accurately reflects the Committee's view of the purpose of the 
amendments. 
Notes of Decisions (84) 
Rules ofEvid., Rule 609, UT R REV Rule 609 
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Current with amendments received through September 15, 2016. 
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